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Petitioner union filed a representation petition with the regional office
of the National Labor Relations Board on behalf of a group of employees
of the Miami Beach Hotel Association, seeking certification as the recognized bargaining agent.1 The Regional Director dismissed the petition
without a hearing, citing the Board's long standing policy of refusing to
exercise jurisdiction over the hotel industry in the states.2 The NLRB,
after a hearing, upheld the Director's determination. 3 Unfair labor practice
charges against the association were similarly dismissed by the General
Counsel 4 Alleging that the Board's decision violated due process and its
rights under the Taft-Hartley Act, the union brought an action in the dis-

trict court for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. The court
upheld NLRB discretionary power to decline jurisdiction over the hotel
industry in the states and granted defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the Board's action was not arbitrary or capricious. 5
On appeal, the circuit court, one member dissenting, affirmed per curiam. 6
The Supreme Court in a short per curiam reversed and remanded to the
circuit court. Hotel Employees Local 255 v. Leedom, 358 U.S. 99 (1958).
Although the authority of the NLRB extends to all industries "affecting interstate and foreign commerce," 7 the Board in its discretion has
refused to assert jurisdiction in cases where it determines that the industry's effect on commerce is not substantial 8 or that the purposes of the
1. The Association comprised approximately 150 of the largest hotels in Miami
Beach, Fla.
2. Order dated July 1, 1955 quoted in district court opinion, 147 F. Supp. 306,
307 (D.D.C. 1957).
3. Until the Board reversed its former policy in The Virgin Isles Hotel Iiw.,
110 NL.R.B. 558 (1954), it had accepted jurisdiction over the hotel industry in the
territories. The Board had always exercised plenary jurisdiction in the District of
Columbia.
4. Order dated Oct. 14, 1955 cited in district court opinion, 147 F. Supp. 306, 307
(D.D.C. 1957).
5. 147 F. Supp. 306 (D.D.C. 1957).
6. 249 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
7. The term "affecting commerce" is defined in §2(7) of the Labor Management
Relations Act, 61 Stat 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1952). See Polish National
Alliance v. NLRB, 322 U.S. 643 (1944); NRLB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939).
8. 21 NLRB AxN. REP. 7-28 (1956). Cf. Hollow Tree Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B.
635 (1950).
(1027)
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Labor Management Relations Act would not be effectuated.9 Under the
Wagner Act the Board was given discretionary jurisdiction in both unfair
labor practice and representation cases. Section 10(a) "empowered" the
Board to act to prevent persons from engaging in unfair labor practices.10
Section 9(c) provided that "the Board may investigate [representation
controversies] and certify to the parties . . . the name or names of the

representatives that have been designated" as the bargaining agents.:" The
Taft-Hartley amendments left the language of section 10(a) unchanged.
However section 9(c) (1) was revised and reworded to provide that:
"whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such
regulations as may be prescribed by the Board-

(A) by an employee .
(B) by an employer . .
the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause
to believe . . . a question of representation affecting commerce exists
• it shall direct an election by secret ballot and shall certify the
results thereof." 12
Legislative history indicates that congressional attention was focused on
two issues: an employer's right to petition the Board, and the requirement
of secret ballot election. There is little indication whether, by the change
to apparently mandatory language, Congress intended to require that the
Board assert jurisdiction in all cases after a preliminary determination that
a question of representation exists. 13 The change, moreover, has not been
presented to or treated by the courts,' 4 and the Board has continued in its
9. Instant case. Cf. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trade Council, 341 U.S.
675 (1951).
10. Ch. 372, § 10(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935) (now 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1952)). It is
clear that this language permits Board discretion. See cases cited note 28 infra.
11. Ch. 372, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935). (Emphasis added.)
12. 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1952). (Emphasis added.)
13. See 1 NLRB, LEGIsLATrvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
Acr, 1947, 9, 69, 117, 185, 245, 326, 376, 431, 554, 653 (1948). Cf. id. at 10, 60, 119,
187, 199, 247, 334, 385, 554, 560-61.
There is language in the House minority report indicating concern over the
effect of the revised wording of § 9(c). It is not clear, however, whether this protest
was directed to the jurisdictional issue. The general sense of the portion of the
report devoted to § 9(c) (1) indicates that the minority was principally concerned
with the expected increase in Board activity due to the necessity for secret elections.
While the history as a whole indicates congressional concern over past Board discrimination against independent unions and a recognition of the need for allowing
employers to petition the Board, there is no indication that the change in language
regarding jurisdiction was designed to further these objectives. Section 9(c) (1) (B)
explicitly provides for employer petitions and § 9(c) (2) is expressly worded to
prevent discrimination by the Board in handling petitions.
14. See Optical Workers Union v. NLRB, 227 F.2d 687 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
351 U.S. 963 (1956). Those cases in which the Board's refusal to assert jurisdiction
has been challenged have involved either an "arbitrary" abuse of discretion in unfair
labor practice cases (see cases cited note 28 infra) or a clear showing of abuse of
statutory requirements in the Board's determination of the appropriate bargaining
agent (see cases cited note 28 infra).
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discretion to refuse to assert jurisdiction in representation as well as in
unfair labor practice cases.15 In 1950, the Board released "jurisdictional
yardsticks" as to when it would probably assert jurisdiction: guides to management and labor formulated on the basis of dollar volume in particular
industries.' 6 The press release contained no mention of the hotel industry,
although a category for "non-retail business" was established. The following year the Board specifically refused to modify its pre-Taft-Hartley
policy of refusing jurisdiction over the industry: In Hotel Ass'n of St.
Louis,1 7 the majority, citing favorable comment by Senator Taft18 and
other Congressmen,' 9 refused to apply non-retail business yardsticks to
hotels on the ground that the "purposes of the act" would not be effectuated
by such assertion of jurisdiction."0 Three subsequent revisions of the
Board's yardsticks have made no specific mention of the hotel industry 21
and the Board has continued on an ad hoc basis to refuse to assert jurisdiction. In the instant case, the Regional Director dismissed the petition
on the ground of "its long standing policy not to assert jurisdiction over
the hotel industry." -2
Subsequent to the district court decision in the instant case but prior
to the circuit court's affirmance, the Supreme Court in Office Employees
Int'l. Union v. NLRB 2 3 held that it was not within the power of the Board
to refuse to exercise jurisdiction over labor unions as a class when acting
in an employer capacity. The Board had dismissed unfair labor practice
charges on behalf of employees of the Teamster's Union on the ground that
while the act included unions within the term "employer," 2 4 unions were
essentially eleemosynary employers over which assertion of jurisdiction
would not effectuate the purposes of the act "in this case." 2 The Court,
unanimously agreed that labor unions are "employers" within section 2 (2)
of the act, held 5-4 that while the Board was empowered to exclude specific
union-employers from coverage of the act on an ad hoc basis in accordance
with dollar volume or other jurisdictional yardsticks, it could not, by
15. McCarron Co., 100 N.L.R.B. 1537 (1952).

(1956).

See 21 NLRB AxN. REP. 7-28

16. NLRB Press Release, No. 342, Oct. 6, 1950. These yardsticks are not binding
on the Board and can be revised or disregarded if the Board chooses. Their purpose
was to eliminate much of the confusion created by ad hoc determinations.
17. 92 N.L.R.B. 1388 (1951).
18. 95 CoNG. REc. 12,697-98 (1949) (remarks of Senator Taft).
19. H.R. REP. No. 2050, 80th Cong., Zd Sess. (1949),
20. 92 N.L.R.B. at 1390 (1951).
21. NLRB Press Release, No. R-576, Oct. 2, 1958; NLRB Press Release, No.
449, July 15, 1954; NLRB Press Release, No. 445, July 1, 1954.

22.
23.
24.
25.

See 147 F. Supp. 306, 307 (1957).
353 U.S. 313 (1957).
LMRA § 2(2), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1952).
Oregon Teamster's Security Plan Office, 113 N.L.R.B. 987 (1955).
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the application of general standards of classification, blanketly refuse to
assert jurisdiction over the entire category of union-employers.2 6 In the
instant case, the Supreme Court held that:
"dismissal of the representation petition on the sole ground of the
Board's 'long standing policy not to exercise jurisdiction over the
hotel industry' as a class, is contrary to the principles expressed in
Office Employees .
"...1,
27

Explicitly treating the appeal as a "dismissal of the representation
petition," 2 8 the Court by its citation of the "principles" expressed in Office
Employees has apparently extended the doctrine of that case to Board
jurisdiction in representation proceedings. The extent to which those
"principles" require Board exercise of jurisdiction over the hotel industry
in the instant case is, however, unclear. The Court's qualifying phrase,
"eon the sole ground," would seem to indicate that the Board is empowered
to refuse to assert jurisdiction in representation cases over an entire industry, if, after full consideration of all the factors involved, it presents
adequate justification for decline of jurisdiction on grounds other than
merely "a long standing policy" of so doing-which ground is "contrary
26. 353 U.S. 313, 318-19 (1957).
27. Instant case. (Emphasis added.)
28. The Court assumes that the instant appeal was from dismissal of a representation petition. The record in the case is unclear in this respect. While the act
does not provide for judicial review of Board action in representation cases, if the
Board contravenes express statutory language, an aggrieved party may invoke district
court equity jurisdiction. See Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958); Farmer v.
United Elec. Workers, 211 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1953). In unfair labor practice cases,
"any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or
in part the relief sought may obtain a review of such order in any circuit court of
appeals .

.

.

."

LMRA § 10(f), 61 Stat. 148 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f)

(1952).

The circuit courts, in determining whether the NLRB has abused its discretionary
power in refusing to assert jurisdiction under § 10(a) apply an "arbitrary and capricious" standard. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957) (federal
pre-emption); Office Employee's Int'l Union v. NLRB, 353 U.S. 313 (1957) (unfair
labor practice); Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 675,
684 (1951) (dictum) (unfair labor practice); Pederson v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 417
(2d Cir. 1956) (unfair labor practice); NLRB v. Guy Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141
(9th Cir. 1952) (unfair labor practice) ; Haleston Drug Stores v. NLRB, 187 F.2d
418 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951) (unfair labor practice). Frequently,
however, unfair labor practices arise as a result of prior Board action in representation proceedings. In such cases Board certifications are indirectly opened for review,
and the circuit court may refuse to enforce the Board's cease and desist order or
may set aside the order on petition of an aggrieved party. See § 10(e) and (f) of
the Taft-Hartley Act. In the present case, union representation petitions were dismissed by the Board. The General Counsel subsequently dismissed the union's unfair
labor practice charges. Instead of seeking review of this order in the circuit court,
the union invoked the district court's equity jurisdiction. That court, however,
treated the action as an appeal from the dismissal of unfair labor practice charges,
employing the "arbitrary and capricious" test in affirming the Board's refusal to assert
jurisdiction. The circuit court affirmed on "District Judge Morris' opinion." 249
F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1957). The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the circuit
court, treating the appeal as one from "dismissal of the representation petition."
Instant case.
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to the principles expressed in Office Employees." 2 9 If, on the other
hand, the words, "as a class," are controlling, as in Office Employees,30
the Court has here adopted the position that the NLRB cannot, without
abusing its discretion, blanketly exclude an "industry" from coverage of the
representation provisions of the act-the policy of exclusion being contrary
to Office Employees principles. Under this interpretation, the Board is
left with power to exercise discretion only on an ad hoc basis. Aside from
the consideration that the NLRB will no doubt arrive ad hoc at exclusion
of the same segments of industry which it now excludes under more general classification policies 3 1-and with a less precise delineation of categories, which may be expected to encourage multiplication of petitions-it
should be noted that such application of Office Employees to representation
proceedings in effect places a heavier burden on the Board than would
even a holding that NLRB jurisdiction in such proceedings is compulsory.
Where the NLRB takes jurisdiction in a representation case, ordinarily
the petition would be processed as a matter -of routine at the regional
the ad hoc rule would require full
level; 3 2 where jurisdiction is declined,
33
Board consideratibn in every case.
In this connection it must be noted that, to whatever extent the Board's
discretion may be limited by the instant holding, that holding implicitly
assumes that NLRB representation jurisdiction is discretionary. It may
be argued that the language of section 9(c) (1)-that "whenever a petition
shall have been filed . . . the Board shall investigate such petition and if

it has reasonable cause to believe a question of representation exists . . . ,
shall direct an election" 34-- is operative only in the event that the Board
makes a preliminary determination that it will assert jurisdiction. Thus,
the word "shall' incorporated in 9(c) (1) by the Taft-Hartley amendments would mean that the Board must proceed with certification procedures only if two conditions precedent are met-an assertion of jurisdiction by the Board on the basis of its "yardstick" formulas 35 and a de29. This view, which would permit the Board to decline jurisdiction over whole
economic areas by blanket policy pronouncements and without repeated ad hoc fact
determination, so long as the Board at least occasionally re-examined and rearticulated
the bases of its policy, would not seem too distant from the position of the dissenters
in Office Employees, and might perhaps explain why the Court could here agree,
without dissent, to the application of Office Employees' "principles". Assuming that
what is demanded is not a mere formal token gesture, but a full reconsideration of
policy and of its application, not the least difficulty with such a demand is that it
leaves unclear precisely how often the Board need reconsider. This would appear
to leave unions over whose petitions a regional office declines to exert jurisdiction
in the position of asking themselves: is it about time to appeal to the Board? and,
subsequently: is it about time to go to the courts?
30. See notes 23-26 supra and accompanying text.
31. See text accompanying note 22 supra.
32. See note 44 infra.
33. See § 9(d) - (f). See also Feldesman, Role of Governim in Labor Relations
Retresentation Cases Decided Under Taft-Hartley Act, 22 LAB. REL. REFF.RENCE
MANUAL 31 (1948).

34. 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1952).
35. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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termination that a question of representation exists.3 6 However, a literal
reading of the section seems to indicate that Board discretion is limited
to the latter condition.-"Whenever a petition shall have been filed . . *
the Board shall investigate . . . ." 37 So interpreted, the act prohibits
the Board from refusing to assert jurisdiction under any "yardstick" or
"purposes of the Act" standard 3 8 It would seem that by treating the
instant appeal as from dismissal of a representation petition, the Supreme
Court has itself posed but not reached this issue of statutory construction,
and that in the event that the Board's refusal of jurisdiction in the instant
case is re-affirmed on grounds other than a "long standing policy," the
Court will then be presented with an opportunity to decide whether section
9(c) (1) requires Board assertion of jurisdiction in all cases where a question of representation exists.
While an adoption of this position would not require an over-ruling
of judicial precedent,39 a long standing practice of the NLRB would be
set aside. Nevertheless, it is submitted that the reasons most often assigned
for permitting Board discretion are no longer applicable in representation
cases. Docket delay, the relative unimportance of some industries with
regard to their impact on commerce, the desirability of lightening the case
load to allow ample time for the Board to examine, re-define, and re-shape
national labor policy, and lack of funds are most often asserted as justification for NLRB discretionary jurisdiction.4
When the Wagner Act was
passed in 1935, these reasons carried considerable weight. The economic
state of the country was unsettled and the impact of the act on the national
economy was uncertain. 41 The pressing need for constructive reform in
the country's basic industries, the immediate task of creating the organizational structure of the Board, and the frankly experimental nature of
many of the act's provisions were ample justification for jurisdictional
flexibility. Today many of the conditions which gave rise to these considerations are no longer present. The organizational structure of the
NLRB has been firmly settled.4 2 Reform has been largely accomplished;
collective bargaining has become the accepted method for settling disputes
in the nation's basic industries.4 While in theory the docket of the Board
may be increased by requiring its assertion of jurisdiction, in practice the
great majority of representation cases could be expected to be handled
36. If in fact the petition for representation is supported by less than thirty per
cent of the employees, or action is barred by an existing contract, no "question of
representation exists." See §9'(c) (1) (A) and (B).
37. 61 Stat 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §159(c) (1) (1952). (Emphasis added.)
38. See text accompanying notes 8, 9, 13, 14 supra.
39. See notes 13, 15 supra.
40. See Forkosch, Jurisdiction and Its Impact on State Powers, 16 Orio ST.
L.J. 301, 353 (1955). Cf. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675, 684 (1951) (dictum).
41. See GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 223-252 (1958).
42. See 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 1-18 (1950).
43. See GREGORY, op. cit. suzpr

note 41, at 497-545.
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by regional directors." Regional disposal of an increased case load would
continue to permit Board re-examination of national labor policy.
Since
collective bargaining has been firmly established in the basic industries,
the ioad is now open for increased consideration of those industries whose
effect on commerce is less substantial. Standing alone, the argument that
lack of funds justifies Board discretion is not persuasive. The same reasoning applies to the increase in functions of any government-supported
institution, including the courts. Lack of financial resources may hamper
the exercise of authorized functions, but it does not justify self-abrogation
of those functions if sufficient policy justification for mandatory exercise
of the power exists.
One other assumption is implicit in the instant holding. The act makes
all industries "affecting commerce" applicable to its provisions. 46 That
phrase has been interpreted as not depending "on any particular volume
of commerce affected more than that to which the courts would apply the
maxim de minirnus." 47 Whatever the meaning of the instant opinion, the
effect of the decision is that at least some portion of the hotel industry
"affects commerce," and is therefore subject to the Board's authority.
Under the federal pre-emption doctrine of Guss v. Utah Labor Relations
Bd.,48 that portion of the industry covered by the act is removed from the
authority of state law.49 If, further, NLRB discretion to refuse jurisdiction is upheld and the Board declines to hear cases, whether on an ad hoc
or a general policy basis, neither state nor federal law will be operative.
Compulsory exercise of jurisdiction in all representations proceedings over
which the NLRB has authority would eliminate this "no man's land,"
thereby further encouraging and fostering self-organization and collective
bargaining. Employers and unions, moreover, would be given the means
by which the rights guaranteed to workers by section 7 of the act could
be more widely and adequately effectuated. 50
44. During the twelve years of the Wagner Act approximately seventy-five per
cent of all representation cases were settled uniformally, and a substantial number of
the remaining twenty-five per cent were settled at the regional level. See 12 NLRB
ANN. REP. 84, 87 (1947). The percentage of cases settled before reaching the Board
has risen slightly under the Taft-Hartley Act. See 16 NLRB ANN. REP. 300 (1951);
21 NLRB ANN. RFa. 169 (1956).
45. Furthermore there are other agencies in existence now which also constantly
supervise the direction of national labor policy.
46. LMRA §2(7), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §152 (1952).
47. NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 684 (1951).
48. 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
49. The Supreme Court has read the proviso to § 10(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act
concerning cessation of power to state labor boards as pre-empting any state action
over industries affecting commerce in the absence of such an agreement. No cessation agreements have been concluded as the overly restrictive nature of the proviso
in requiring almost absolute conformity between the state act and the federal act
practically bars any such agreements. See Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353
U.S. 1 (1957); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953).
50. LMRA §7, 61 Stat 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1952) provides: "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and
to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid and protection. ..
"
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ADMIRALTY-UxITED

STATES HELD ENTITLED TO STATUS OF
OwNER AFTER SALE OF SHIP FOB PURPOSES OF LIMrr
N OF
LIABILITY

Shortly after the United States sold a reserve merchant tanker to a
shipping company, an explosion occurred aboard the ship killing or injuring fifty-two persons and causing widespread property damage. The
shipping company and others sued the United States in admiralty 1 for
breach of warranty-2 alleging that fuel oil in the ship, misrepresented as
bunker fuel, in fact contained certain volatile components which had caused
the explosion. The United States petitioned to limit its liability to the
value of the ship under the provision of the Federal Limitation of Liability
Act 3 which permits the "owner" of a ship to limit his liability to the value
of his interest. The federal district court held that though the United
States had terminated its interest in the ship, it was still an "owner" within
the meaning of the act, and granted the petition to limit liability. In re
The Trojan, 167 F. Supp. 576 (N.D. Cal. 1958).
As a part of European maritime law for several centuries, 4 the limitation of liability principle was designed to encourage the shipping industry
by assuring shipowners that a single catastrophe would not dissipate all
other assets. After initial judicial rejection of the doctrine in this country,'
Congress enacted the limitation principle into law in 1851 in order to put
American shipowners on a par with European interests. 6 The present
Limitation of Liability Act 7 provides:
"The liability of the owner of any vessel . . . for any . . . loss
• . . of any property . . . or for any . . . damage, or for1. The United States has waived its sovereign immunity to suit by the Suits in
Admiralty Act, 41 Stat 525 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§741-52 (1952).
2. Apparently the reason that plaintiff preferred to bring contract rather than
negligence action was not only the greater ease of proving breach of contract but
also consideration of the construction placed by the courts on the Federal Limitation
of Liability Act §183(a), Riay. STAT. §4283 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 183(a)
(1952), which provides that "privity or knowledge" of the owner with regard to the
action causing the damage will deprive him of limitation. The courts have held
that there is "privity," and therefore no limitation, on personal contracts such as
those for supplies, etc. Many attempts have been made by plaintiffs to escape the
limitation rule by suit sounding in contract. See, e.g., I. re Wood's Petition (The
Susan), 230 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1956). Since suit on an implied warranty is, factually
and in legal theory, so close to the negligence action from whose extreme liabilities
Congress wished to insulate shipowners, it seems clear that change of the form of
action alone should not prevent limitation. See generally Gn.AroR & BLACK, ADmnALTY 695-705 (1957).
3. REV. STAT. § 4281 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1952).
4. See The Main v. Williams, 152 U.S. 122 (1894); Norwich Co. v. Wright,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104 (1871); The Rebecca, 20 Fed. Cas. 373 (No. 11,619) (D.Me.
1831).
5. The Rebecca, supra note 4. See concurring opinion of Justice Woodbury in
New Jersey Steam Nay. Co. v. Merchants Bank (The Lexington), 47 U.S. (6 How.)
343, 434 (1848).
6. GiLmopE & BLACK, ADmIzRALTY 666 (1957).

7. REv.

STAT.

§ 4281 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-89 (1952).
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feiture, done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner . . . shall not . . . exceed the amount or
value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight
then pending." 8
The full extent of liability, until amendment of the act in 1935 and 1936,9
was the value of the ship after catastrophe-often little or nothing.10 The
1935-36 amendments set certain minimum liability for personal injury and
loss of life, and seem in philosophy to indicate a retreat from the most
sweeping application of the limitation rule." As a device for the protection
of risk capital, limitation has declined in importance because of widespread
insurance coverage, government subsidies to the maritime industry, and the
practice of incorporating each ship individually as a means of limiting liability.'2 Nonetheless, it remains important to large fleet owners who find it
impracticable to incorporate every ship,' 3 to small individual owners, and
to charterers, who are given the same protection as owners under section
186 of the act.14
The instant case presents the problem of the proper interpretation of
the term, "owner" of any vessel, under section 183 (a). 15 The Supreme
Court has said that the section should be construed to achieve its purpose:
"to encourage ship-building and to induce capitalists to invest money in
this branch of industry." '6 Inasmuch as it is most unlikely that the United
States, bound by its world-wide defense commitments to the maintenance
of an extensive merchant fleet, could be encouraged or deterred in continued maritime investment by operation of the limitation of liability
principle, it is to be wondered how much the instant case, in any event, can
contribute to that legislative purpose. But Congress has itself foreclosed
the argument that the Government, as Government, is not contemplated
within the intendment of "owner." Express statutory provision extends
to the United States "the benefits of all exemptions and of all limitations
of liability accorded by law to the owners, charterers, operators, or agents
of vessels." 17 This provision puts the case in the posture of a proceeding
8. REV. STAT. §4283 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §183(a) (1952).
9. Act of Aug. 29, 1935, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 960; Act of June 5, 1936, ch. 521, 49 Stat.

1479.

10. GII sopm & BLAcK. ADmntALTw 669 (1957).
11. See id. at 666-67.
12. Id. at 663.
13. Ibid.
14. REv. STAT. §4286 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §186 (1952) provides that
a charterer who shall "man, victual and navigate" the vessel "at his own expense, or

by his own procurement" shall be deemed an "owner" within the meaning of the act,
and is thus entitled to limitation on the same footing as the owner.
15. RFv. STAT. §4283 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §183(a) (1952) set out
in text accompanying note 8 .spra.

16. Norwich Co. v. Wright, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 104, 121 (1871).
17. 41 Stat. 527 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §746 (1952); 43 Stat. 1113 (1925), 46 U.S.C.
§789 (1952).
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involving only private parties. As between such parties, it would seem
that fulfillment of the statutory purpose to protect risk capital in commercial
maritime activity could best be accomplished by confining limitation to selffinancing charterers and title holders currently operating vessels for the
carriage of goods or passengers, or in ventures important to commercial
maritime activity.Is Limitation, being a harsh rule and one invoked to the
detriment of injured parties, should not be extended to situations where
it is not required by the overweening public interest in encouragement
of commercial navigation. 19 Numerous cases, ° however, appear to have
eschewed the legislative purpose with regard to the analogous question
of interpretation of the term "vessel" in section 183; limitation has been
extended to the owners of pleasure yachts, which, clearly, do not constitute
the kind of maritime enterprise which the act was designed to promote.
And, despite the primary legislative purpose of protecting essentially
commercial, economically fruitful shipping uses, the language of the section,
in terms, applies both "vessels" and "owners" without qualification, without distinction among types of craft or of activity for which they are owned.
In the case of American Car & Foundry Co. v. BrassertY it was held
that a manufacturer who had sold a yacht and who retained only a security
title to insure payment was not entitled to limitation as an owner in a suit
arising out of an explosion caused by manufacturing defect. The Court
said that for purposes of use in navigation, the vessel belonged to the
vendee; that the purpose of the act was not concerned "with construction
as mere enterprise of manufacture, which itself was not a maritime activity." 22

Thus one who had legal title, but who for practical purposes

exercised no control over the activities of the craft, and who was not himself engaged in risking his capital in commercial maritime activity, was not
an "owner" who could bring himself within the statutory protection for
purposes, at least, of limiting liability arising out of defects of manufacture.m
18. Tugs and towing, for example. A mere bailee or licensee is not entitled to
the protection of the act. The Severance, 152 F.2d 916 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied
sub noam., Stone v. Diamond S.S. Transp. Corp., 328 U.S. 853 (1946).
19. See note 28 infra. See also GiImouE & BLACK, ADmIRIArY 700 (1957).
20. Coryell v. Phipps, 317 U.S. 406 (1943) ; Feige v. Hurley, 89 F.2d 575 (6th
Cir. 1937); In the Matter of Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73 (D. Conn. 1954);
The Trillora II, 76 F. Supp. 50 (E.D.S.C. 1947); The Trim Too, 39 F. Supp. 271
(D. Mass. 1941); Petition of Liebler (The Francesca), 19 F. Supp. 829 (W.D.N.Y.
1937). These decisions have been severely criticized. See GIImoa & BLACK, ADiRALTxy 700-01 (1957). But the 1936 amendments to § 183, which provide for setting
up a $60 per ton fund for all "seagoing vessels" for loss of life or bodily injury where
liability limited to owner's interests in those vessels is insufficient to pay all losses
in full, 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46 U.S.C. § 183(b) (1952), specifically exempt from
the $60 per ton requirement the class: "pleasure yachts." 49 Stat. 1479 (1936), 46
U.S.C. § 183 (f) (1952). The express exemption would demonstrate congressional
understanding that pleasure yachts are otherwise "vessels" within the meaning of

§ 183.

21. 289 U.S. 261 (1933).
22. Id. at 263.
23. In setting the instant case off against American Car, a curious commingling
of issues arises, derived in part from the different jurisprudential framing of the two
cases. In both situations, the courts are faced with a petitioner who, having at one
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Is it possible, then, that one whose interest in the vessel had wholly terminated, who held no title at all, and who also was no longer engaged, as
regards the ship in question, in commercial maritime activity, could be
time possessed with regard to the respective ships in question that aggregate of
characteristic attributes to which the courts would attach the rubric "complete" or
"unquestionable!' ownership (see instant case at 578), has since divested himself of
some of those attributes, having, however, prior to the time of divesting, committed
certain acts upon the ship which, at a time subsequent to divesting, have resulted in
the occurrence of harm or injury. In American Car, the divesting of attributes had
been only partial, leaving in petitioner a lesser combination of attributes, what the
courts would call "legal title!'; in the instant case, divesting was complete. In fitting
these two fact situations to a statute which purports to limit the "liability" of "owners,"
distinct conceptual problems arise. In American Car, because "legal title' is left,
and because "legal title" comports enough of the attributes and elements of "ownership" to fall within one common and acceptable signification of that latter phrasebecause, therefore, petitioner is an "owner" within the face meaning of the statute
-the court, if it wants petitioner out, must read him out. In the instant case, on
the other hand, no attributes of "ownership" remain; petitioner is not an "owner"
in any sense in which that word is commonly used; if the court wants him in, it must
actively read him in.
The American Car court, first, faced with the problem of appraising their petitioner's situation in light of a statute limiting owners' liability, decides that the
situation is not one to which Congress purposed to extend protection. It may now
articulate that result by alternative formulations: that petitioner is not an "owner";
or that, although petitioner is an "owner," the particular kind of "liability" herein
attaching to him is not that which the act limits. A third, hybrid alternative also
exists: The court may reason that, because the relations of petitioner to the ship have
been such as to give rise to liabilities that Congress did not intend to limit, and only
to liabilities that Congress did not intend to limit, petitioner cannot be an "owner"
within the meaning of the section. It is in fact this last alternative which the
Averican Car opinion appears to take. Leaving somewhat unclear whether it intends
to construe "owner" or "liability," the Court reads petitioner out of the statute. But
what manifestly determines this result is the Court's conviction that petitioner's
activities on the vessel, activities as a result of which the damage or injury occurred,
were not those which Congress intended to insulate. "The liability thus limited is
an imputed liability; it is a liability imputed by law by reason of the ownership of
the vessel. For his own fault, neglect and contracts the owner remains liable. . . .
What, then, is the liability which petitioner seeks to limit? It is manifestly not a
liability imputed to petitioner as shipowner. . . . If such liability existed, it arose
not because petitioner reserved title, while delivering possession and control of use,
but because it was manufacturer and vendor. . . . Similarly, as to other persons
.... ,petitioner's liability, if any, had no relation to any responsibility of petitioner
as holder of the naked title, but would depend upon petitioner's conduct as maker of
the vessel, that is, upon the question whether in the circumstances petitioner could be
held guilty of actionable neglect in its manufacture. . . . Whatever liability there
may be in that aspect . . . , it is not a liability falling within the policy and purview
of the Act of Congress limiting the liability of shipowners." American Car & Foundry
Co. v. Brassert, 289 U.S. 261, 264, 265, 266 (1933). Thus, an "owner" is not an
"owner" for purposes of limitation of liability unless he is an "owner" for purposes
of imputing of liability, see id. at 264-65; or, alternatively, "liability" not imputed is
not limited.
The instant court, on the other hand, is faced with a petitioner whose activities
are clearly those which the act sought to protect. Although, when couched in terms
of breach of warranty, see note 2 slepra, petitioner's liability is, in a sense, the liability of a "vendor," American Car & Foundry Co. v. Brassert, supra at 265, it is
predicated upon activities for which responsibility will be "imputed" to petitioner as
former shipowner. But, because this petitioner has none of the attributes of current
ownership, although he must be found to be an "owner" to secure protection under
the act, the court must find a way to make him an "owner." This the court does by
finding that "the alleged liability arose as the result of negligent conduct occurring
before sale and during ownership, at which time limitation would clearly have been
available," instant case at 578, thus impliedly following the American Car test of
imputed liability. American Car is articulately distinguished: "If petitioner as a
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construed to be an "owner ?" The instant court faced this situation, and,
in granting limitation, relied on the argument that otherwise a vendor would
be subject to greater liability after a sale than before 2 4 This reasoning
manufacturer not engaged in maritime activity could not have the benefit of limitation
before the sale, he is in no better position after the sale." Instant case at 579.
The difficulty with this reasoning is that it assumes that Congress intended no
further restriction of the limitation principle by giving limitation only to an "owner"
than that restriction which is already implicit in limitation only of "liability . . . for
any . . . loss . . . of any property . . . or for any . . . damage, or forfeiture,

done, occasioned, or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner."
RV. STAT. §4283 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. § 183(a) (1952). This assumption
did not have to be made in American Car, where the problem was reading out a
petitioner who was clearly an "owner" within the face meaning of the act; but the
assumption does become operative in the instant decision. Here the court, faced with
a petitioner who is not an "owner" within any normal use of the term, finds him
covered by the statute on grounds that his liability is of the nature of that which
the act is intended to limit. Whether petitioner himself is, as well, of that class of
persons to which the act intends to extend protection, is not separately asked. Thus,
while American Car, which appears to have been primarily concerned with the question
of what "liability" is covered, turns out to have said some things relevant to the
question of what constitutes an "owner," the instant case, in explicitly deciding the
"owner" issue, is in fact asking primarily the what-kind-of-liability question.
The assumption itself, that "owner" imposes no further curb on the expanse
of the act than is implicit in "liability" of the kind specified, is quite tenable, especially
if the words "the liability of the owner of any vessel . . . shall not . . . exceed
...
" Rv. STAT. §4283 (1875), as amended, 46 U.S.C. §183(a) (1952), be read

as meaning: the limits of shipowner's liability, qua shipowner's liability, shall be....
But it is equally plausible, and seemingly more consonant with the intent of the act
to protect risk capital in shipping, see text accompanying notes 16 and 18 supra, to
hold that "owner" intends an independent restriction of the scope of the act to those
persons who in fact invest such capital in shipping. Cf. The Severance, 152 F2d 916
(4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied srub noin., Stone v. Diamond S. S. Transp. Co., 328 U. S.
853 (1946). See also Black, J., for four members of the Court in Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 433 (1954). Such a concept could exclude from operation
of the act a shipbuilder who builds to order on commission, although the particular
liability sought to be vested on him was in fact "imputed" within the meaning of
American Car; his liability for damages resulting, not from defects of manufacture,
but from operations on a trial run, for example, would not be limited.
But, if the "owner" requirement, so conceived, would refuse limitation to some
classes of persons who, in common parlance, might be considered legal "owners,"
would it also operate to include some classes of persons who have no present right,
title or interest in the vessel? Specifically, should it include some classes of former
owners who have now disposed of their interests? The arguments for such inclusion
are set out in text following note 24 infra; the arguments against inclusion, in text
accompanying and following note 25 infra. The significant question here, however,
is: assuming that some classes of former owners, i.e. sellers, should be included, how
are those classes to be distinguished? The American Car test, relation of the seller's
activities to the nature of the liability sought to be limited, is clearly inapplicable.
Rather, the most plausible line of distinction between classes of sellers turns upon
whether the seller, during the period of his holding title, had invested risk capital in
the vessel. To the extent that many manufacturers of large vessels do not themselves finance the enterprise, but build on order for the future operator, manufacturers as a group might in fact tend to aggregate in one, rather than the other, of
these two classes of sellers. But to describe the classes in terms of the manufacturer
rubric is misleading. The basis of the distinction would lie rather in the desire to
extend the statutory protection to all those who, at any stage, put investment at
risk into the maritime venture. See text accompanying note 16 supra.
24. The court relied on In re Highland Nay. Corp., 24 F.2d 582 (S.D.N.Y.
1927), affirmed m alternate ground sub nown., Petition of Highlands Nay. Corp.,
29 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1928), in which petition for limitation was allowed to one who
had abandoned the vessels after they had burned alongside the pier. The City of New
York sought damages for the cost of removing the wreck and losses due to obstruction of the pier. However, here the act which caused liability occurred during the
period of ownership. The court admitted, instant case at 578, that the cases cited
in the Government's brief were distinguishable.
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must be evaluated against the intention of the act to give the extraordinary
protection of limitation to those whose capital is ventured in the shipping
industry. On the one hand, it may be argued that fleet owners who sell
used and unneeded ships should be entitled to limitation because they have
been, and presumably still are, engaged in commercial maritime activity,
and should be differently treated than mere sellers who manufacture or
trade in ships. Denial of limitation may, in the long view, discourage the
investment in navigatory enterprise of those who know, even before acquisition of a vessel, that they will at some time in the future dispose of
it; further, full liability may operate to dissipate the assets of the fleet owner
which remain in shipping after the sale of the individual ship in question.
This possibility of ruinous liability after sale, however, is both more
speculative and more evitable than the danger of similar loss during the
period of active participation in the activities of the vessel. Simply because he is no longer involved in the uninterrupted operative running of
the craft, because he has come to a point of halt, and of winding up of
affairs, a seller has opportunity to make one final, thorough inspection of the
ship, and so, once for all, assure his own freedom from fault. Potential
liability to the buyer himself may be limited by the contract of sale, and
on ordinary tort and contract principles successful suit by injured third
parties seems unlikely.2 Encouragement of investment by limitation becomes progressively less necessary, of course, as the actual risk or probability of incurring liability declines. The seller, further, by the very
act of sale, has withdrawn from the sphere of commercial navigation, where
Congress intended that it be protected, whatever capital investment is
represented by the value of this particular vessel; for a seller places no risk
capital in the shipping industry; a seller takes capital out. Whatever
continuing relationship the seller may maintain with maritime enterprise,
it is unconnected with this ship in which he formerly had placed his capital,
now withdrawn. And, finally, no matter what refinement be placed upon
the statutory term "owner," it would seem improper to expand its scope
beyond all ordinary usage to include a seller who retains neither active
participation and control, nor any other attribute typical of ownership, nor
25. A third party would have difficulty in proving negligence by the seller. Even
if there were defects in a used ship, it seems likely that the new buyer would be
charged with responsibility for them unless there was some intentional concealment.

While under the rule of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.

1050 (1916) a manufacturer might be held liable for a product dangerous if negligently
made, the same doctrine would not apply to a seller. Such negligence liability would

not in any case be limited by the act, according to the principle of American Car.
See note 23 supra. And under contract principles, a third party would be barred by
lack of privity with the new owner's vendor.

PRossm , ToRTs 506-10 (2 ed. 1955).

While the law is not altogether clear, it seems that third parties would be limited to
recovery from the new owner rather than the seller and that the new owner would
be entitled to limitation of liability. See, e.g., Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., 163
F2d 286 (1st Cir. 1947).

(Plaintiff injured by defective winch on ship chartered

by defendant to United Fruit Co., held: suit lies only against charterer as owner
pro hac vice. See also In re New York Dock Co., 61 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1932) ;
Muscelli v. Frederick Starr Contracting Co., 296 N.Y. 330, 73 N.E2d 536 (1947).
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continuing cash investment, nor even color of legal title.26 Unlike the
seller in American Car, the United States had here "disposed of all right,
title and interest," 2 7 retaining not even that nominal legal title upon which
an interpreting court, looking for a hook, could happily hang a tag of
"owner." 28 At any rate, there can be found -little reason in the instant
case to strain to seek out hooks. In view of a seller's withdrawal of his
maritime capital, of his improbable exposure to harm, and of his opportunity
to save himself harmless there seems no sound policy base for so extraordinary and expansive a reading of the statutory language. 29

ARREST-H ,ARsAy

IFoRmATIoN HED STFFIorMNT "PROBABL
CAUSE" FOR ARREST WITHOUT A WARRANT

Petitioner was arrested without a warrant and convicted pursuant to
the Narcotic Drugs Import and Export Act' of knowingly concealing
and transporting heroin. The arresting federal agent's only information came from a reliable informant 2 who stated on September 3 that
petitioner, whom he identified by name, was peddling narcotics, and on
September 7 that petitioner was returning to Denver by train September
8 or 9 and would be carrying heroin. The informant gave the agent a detailed physical description of petitioner. Neither the Narcotics Bureau
nor the agent had any other knowledge of petitioner or his activities. On
September 9, the agent and a local police officer, posted at the station, saw
a man answering informant's description of petitioner alight from a train,
immediately arrested and searched him, and found heroin. Before the
trial, petitioner moved to suppress the evidence as having been secured
through an unlawful search and seizure. The district court 3 found that
26. See In the Matter of Colonial Trust Co., 124 F. Supp. 73, 76 (D. Conn. 1954).
27. Instant case at 578.
28. See discussion in note 23 supra.
29. See Maryland Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409, 437 (1954). Mr. Justice
Black, for four dissenting members of the Court, writes: "Judicial expansion of the
Limited Liability Act at this late date seems especially inappropriate. Many of the
conditions in the shipping industry which induced the 1851 Congress to pass the Act
no longer prevail. And later Congresses, when they wished to aid shipping, provided
subsidies paid out of the public treasury rather than subsidies paid by injured persons." The original purpose of the Limitation Act was to put American shippers on
a par with their European counterparts. Today this is done by government ship
construction and operating loss deductions. See GiuLoRE & BLAcK, AmMALTY 76165 (1957).

1. 35 Stat. 614 (1909), as amended, 21 U.S.C. § 174 (1952).
2. Informant was "a 'special employee' of the Bureau of Narcotics at Denver for
about six months, and from time to time gave information to [the agent] regarding
violations of the narcotics laws, for which [the informant] was paid small sums of
money." It was established that the agent "had always found the information . . .
to be accurate and reliable." Instant case at 331.
3. 146 F. Supp. 689 (D. Colo. 1956).
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the agent had probable cause to arrest petitioner without a warrant and that
the search was therefore incident to a lawful arrest. The Tenth Circuit 4
and the Supreme Court 1 affirmed. Draperv. United States, 358 U.S. 307
(1959).
Since search of an arrested person without a warrant is admittedly
lawful when incident to a valid arrest,6 the determinative issue of the instant
case is the validity of petitioner's arrest without an arrest warrant where
the sole information known to the arresting officer from which petitioner's
commission of a narcotics violation might have been inferred was "reliable"
hearsay. The fourth amendment prohibition that "no Warrant shall issue,
but upon probable cause," 7 applies to arrests as well as to searches.8
Arrests and searches made under authority of a warrant have been invalidated when the supporting affidavits have not been properly verified, 9
when the facts upon which probable cause was based were not sufficiently
close in time to the request for the warrant, 10 and when the facts themselves
were insufficient to support a reasonable belief that the person against whom
the warrant was sought had committed the offense charged.11 Moreover,
it has been held that an arrest is invalid when a warrant is issued in the
absence of personal knowledge by the complaining officer of the facts
purported to constitute probable cause.' 2 However, there has been recent
indication that the complaining officer's personal knowledge is not a prerequisite to the validity of a warrant.1a With regard to the validity of
4. 248 F2d 295 (10th Cir. 1957).
5. Mr. Justice Douglas dissented. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Frankfurter took no part in the consideration or decision.
6. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). A search without a warrant may also be based on independent grounds of probable cause. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 158-59 (1925).
7. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized." U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
8. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958).
9. Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1 (1927).
10. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
11. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958); Grau v. United States,
287 U.S. 124 (1932). See generally Perkins, Tlw Law of Arrest, 25 IowA L. REV.
201, 213-14 (1940).
12. Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933) ; Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927) ; United States ex rel. King v. Gokey, 32 F.2d 793 (N.D.N.Y.
1929). "By the weight of authority it is not enough merely to aver suspicion, or belief
on information received from others, but there must be an averment of personal
knowledge and belief."

OR-mzlw, CRIMINAL PRocEDURE FRom ARREST TO APPEAL

10-11 (1947).
13. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (dictum). But see United
States v. Langsdale, 115 F. Supp. 489 (W.D. Mo. 1953). The Supreme Court has
held that the complaining officer need not have personal knowledge in extradition
cases. Rice v. Ames, 180 U.S. 371 (1901). Grand jury indictments based wholly
on hearsay evidence have also been upheld, Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359
(1956), on the ground that grand juries conclusively determine the issue of probable
cause. Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241 (1932). These cases, however, do not
speak directly to the constitutional issue, inasmuch as "[no] constitutional provision
prescribes the kind of evidence upon which grand juries must act." Costello v. United
States, supra at 362. See also Giordenello v. United States, vtpra at 487.
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arrests made without a warrant, in the absence of an applicable federal
statute, the law of the state where the arrest is made governs. 14 Adopting
provisions generally applicable in the states, the Narcotic Control Act provides that an arrest may be made without a warrant "where the violation
is committed in the presence of the person making the arrest or where such
person has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed or is committing such violation." 15 The "reasonable grounds"
requirement of the Narcotic Act and the "probable cause" requirement
in the state law for arrest without a warrant have been held equivalent to
the "probable cause" requirement in the fourth amendment. 16 Judicial
formulations of what constitutes probable cause are myriad and frequently
unenlightening.' 7 Unquestionably, it means more than a mere suspicion ' 8
but, on the other hand, not all the information relied upon to establish
probable cause need be such that it would be admissible evidence on the
issue of guilt.'9 In cases involving the validity of an arrest made without
a warrant some circuit courts have held that facts constituting probable
cause may be based entirely on hearsay; 'o others have indicated that
hearsay alone is insufficient. 2 ' The latter, however, have found hearsay
sufficient when buttressed by such corroborating evidence 2 as personal
observation by the arresting officers of the arrestee's contemporary association with prior offenders, or of actions indicating commission of the
14. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) ; United States v. Coplon, 185
F.2d 629, 634 (2d Cir. 1950) ; United States v. Sipes, 132 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Tenn.
1955).
15. INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 7607(2). An officer may also arrest without a
warrant for a misdemeanor committed in his presence. Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925); Wrightson v. United States, 222 F2d 556, 558 (D.C.
Cir. 1955).
16. Instant case at 310; United States v. Walker, 246 F2d 519, 526 (7th Cir.
1957) ; Wrightson v. United States, supra note 15; Worthington v. United States,
166 Ff2d 557, 562 (6th Cir. 1948). See generally Foote, Law and Police Practice:
Safeguards in the Law of Arrest, 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 16, 39-40 (1957).
17. E.g.: "It is enough if the apparent facts which have come to his attention
are sufficient, in the circumstances, to lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man
to believe . . . ," Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694, 701 (1931); "the
facts and circumstances within their knowledge and of which they had reasonably
trustworthy information were sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief . . .

,"

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925);

"if the facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of
prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed, it is sufficient,"
Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645 (1878).
18. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 173-77 (1949).
19. Ibid. See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931) ; United States
v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105 (2d Cir. 1945).
20. United States v. Walker, 246 F.2d 519, 525 (7th Cir. 1957); Wrightson v.
United States, 236 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Mueller v. Powell, 203 F.2d 797,
802-03 (8th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Li Fat Tong, 152 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1950) ;
United States v. Heitner, supra note 19. See generally Perkins, supra note 11, at 239.
21. Browner v. United States, 215 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1954) ; United States v.
Bianco, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951); Wisniewski v. United States, 47 F.2d 825
(6th Cir. 1931) ; cf. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938).
22. United States v. Bianco, supra note 21, at 720.
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offense.23 On the other hand, in two of the five circuit court cases 24
holding that facts based entirely on hearsay may constitute probable cause,
circumstances tending to corroborate the commission of the offense charged
were observed by the arresting officers: in Li Fat Tong, defendant's prior
record was known and the officers smelled opium when they conversed with
him; in Heitner,the defendants "obviously fled" when they saw the arresting officers. And in another two of the cases,2 the arresting officers had
at least some prior knowledge of the arrestee: 26 in Walker, the defendant
was seen with a prior arrestee and was listed in local police files; in
Wrightson, the arresting officer had been investigating defendant's activities for some time. One circuit has held that personal knowledge of
another officer transmitted to the arresting officer will suffice despite the
latter's lack of personal knowledge. 27 Finally, the Supreme Court has held
that a reliable informant's tip, coupled with the arresting officer's knowledge that the arrestee was a prior offender and with the arrestee's attempted escape when hailed by the officer is sufficient "probable cause." 28
But neither the presence of the arrestee at the scene of a felony observed
to have been committed by another nor mere failure to resist an unlawful
arrest will constitute probable cause.2 9 In any case, it appears that the
practicability of procuring a warrant-primarily with regard to the element of time-is an important factor in determining whether the courts
will find probable cause for search or arrest without a warrant.30
Whether facts constituting probable cause may be based solely on
hearsay information was thus an issue of first impression before the Supreme Court.3 1 The burden of dissenters' arguments in both the Supreme
Court a2 and the court of appeals 33 was that no judicial officer would have
23. Scher v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938) ; Wisniewsld v. United States,
47 F.2d 825 (6th Cir. 1931). Compare Nichols v. United States, 176 F.Zd 431 (8th
Cir. 1949), with United States v. Sipes, 132 F. Supp. 537 (E.D. Tenn. 1955).
24. See note 20 supra.
25. Ibid.
26. In the fifth case, Mueller v. Powell, 203 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1953), a Civil
Rights Act action for a murder arrest, the arresting officer had received a multitude
of information from several local townspeople.

27. United States v. Bianco, 189 F.2d 716 (3d Cir. 1951).
28. Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931).
29. United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1948). But see Kaiser v.
United States, 60 F2d 410 (8th Cir. 1932) (probable cause found when officer
stopped arrestee who then confessed).
30. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1948). See also United States
v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66
(1950); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948); Taylor v. United
States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) ; Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151, 153 (1925).
31. See, e.g., Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485 (1958) : "But we
need not decide whether a warrant may be issued solely on hearsay information
32. "If [the officer]went to a magistrate to get a warrant of arrest and relied
solely on the report of the informer, it is not conceivable to me that one would be
granted." Instant case at 339.
33. "He would have been laughed out of court." 248 F.2d at 302.
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issued an arrest warrant to an officer armed solely with the information
possessed by the agent in the instant case. The only answer of the Supreme
Court majority was that the arresting officer "personally verified every facet
of the information given him by [the informant]" 34 in reference to petitioner's description. If the Court meant to designate this as corroborative
evidence, it corroborates only that petitioner was dressed and looked as
described; it does not corroborate the commission of any offense.30 No
suspicious behavior was observed at the time of the arrest itself, and the
arresting officer neither had any prior acquaintance with petitioner nor
knew anything whatever about him except what was learned from the
informant. It appears, then, that the Supreme Court has here established
a precedent for affirmance of a finding of probable cause for arrest without
a warrant on the sole basis of a reliable informant's uncorroborated reportao
In support of this position it may be argued that the exclusionary
hearsay rule, designed to invariably keep from a lay jury evidence which
it is felt that they may in some cases be incompetent to weigh, 7 has no
place in the ascertainment by a magistrate of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant, a proceeding expressly designed to test whether, upon
all the facts known to government officials in each particular case, arrest
34. Instant case at 313.
35. But see Browner v. United States, 215 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1954): "The
information received by the agents from the informer did not of itself warrant the
arrest; but, when the defendants appeared at the home of the informer at approximately the time agreed upon and answered the description given to the agents, it
imparted verity to the information received."
36. It may be questioned whether the Court has likewise established a precedent
that fourth amendment probable cause for the issuance of a search or arrest warrant
may be found on the same basis. Since few officers would seek a warrant if they
felt that the information they possessed would be insufficient to satisfy a commissioner
yet sufficient to allow them with impunity to make arrest without a warrant, any
lesser standard of probable cause for arrests without a warrant than for the issuance
of a warrant would render the constitutional safeguards of the fourth amendment
meaningless. Wrightson v. United States, 222 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1955). See
generally Foote, supra note 16, at 38. It is unlikely, therefore, that the Court, in the
instant case, intended to repudiate the single standard of probable cause. See text
and note accompanying note 16 supra. Thus, by close analogy at least, the case stands
as strong authority for the proposition that fourth amendment probable clause for issuance of a warrant may also be found solely upon "reliable" hearsay. It should be noted
that the dissenting opinions in two courts appear to argue that the arrest here was unlawful not because, had the arresting agent appeared before a magistrate with the hearsay information upon which he in fact made arrest without a warrant, the magistrate
could not have issued a warrant, but because, had the agent so appeared, the magistrate would not have issued a warrant. See notes 32, 33 supra and accompanying
text Inasmuch as, accepting an invariable single standard for probable cause both
for issuance of a warrant and for arrest without a warrant, only argument that a
magistrate, upon the information held by the officer here, could not have issued a
warrant would be relevant to the point at issue, it may be suggested that the dissenters might have the courts look nwre critically at probable cause for the purpose
of arrest without warrant where the arresting officer had ample time to secure a
warrant but in fact failed to do so. See text accompanying note 40 infra. It is
perhaps more plausible, however, to read the respective dissenting opinions as arguing
that a magistrate here would not have issued a warrant because he constitutionally
could not; under this view the dissenters would reverse a magistrate's finding of
probable cause upon the information known to the arresting officer in this case.
37. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 349, 356 (D. Mass.
1950).
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of a citizen is justified.38 It is indisputable that hearsay often is reliable,
and the exigencies of modern criminal administration may at times demand
reliance on it.39 Similarly, where circumstances of time make necessary
immediate police action without a warrant, to require verification of hearsay
by personal observation may often unduly hamper efficient law enforcement. Too stringent judicial scrutiny by courts sitting far removed from
the operative events may give slight shrift to circumstances compelling
in context. But to accept a single standard of probable cause for both
issuance of a warrant and arrest without a warrant under conditions of
pressing time, and to say that "reliable" hearsay satisfies that standard,
does not prevent a reviewing court from looking more severely to the
grounds for probable cause in cases where time clearly permitted police
to secure a warrant but where they did not secure one.40 The very
difficulties inherent in long-subsequent judicial review of "probable cause"
seem to demand immediate, prior judicial scrutiny wherever possible;
and police should be discouraged from bypassing the magistracy save in
41
cases of most pressing urgency.
While it is true that a retrospective consideration of whether the
arresting officer had time to obtain a warrant may often be unrealistic,4
and may deter effective police enforcement,4 courts should not hesitate to
insist, in cases where available time was clearly sufficient, that police officers
test their basis of probable cause before a judicial official. In the instant
case, the officers could do nothing to further the arrest betveen the time
on September 7 when they received the information and the morning of
September 8 when petitioner, at the earliest, was supposed to arrive by
train. Furthermore, there appears no reason why one officer should not
have sought a warrant on September 8 or 9 while the other(s) waited at
the railroad station for petitioner. Accepting the proposition that reliable
hearsay may alone constitute probable cause, a dispassionate commissioner
is unarguably more competent to pass on the question of reliability than
the officer seeking to make the arrest. Moreover, the information received in the instant case was not that a felony had in fact been committed
but that a felony would in the future be committed. And it appears that the
only information acquired by the agent was informant's conclusion that
petitioner would arrive with heroin. There was no evidence that the
source of informant's report was communicated to the officers. Had this
information, then, been brought before a commissioner, even though we
admit that upon such hearsay alone the commissioner could have issued a
38. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-73 (1949).
39. United States v. Heitner, 149 F.2d 105, 106 (2d Cir. 1945).
40. See note 30 mepra.
41. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 (1948).
"Absent some grave
emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate betveen the citizen
and the police." Id. at 455.
42. Rabinowitz v. United States, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950).
43. Foote, stpra note 16, at 12-13.
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warrant, it is likely that the commissioner would " in fact have refused issuance in the absence of appearance before him of the informant himself.
It is prior critical scrutiny of this sort, objective evaluation of all the
relevant facts known, that the fourth amendment requirement of probable
cause would appear to demand. To secure that scrutiny and to assure that
warrants be sought wherever practicable, the same reviewing court which
would not have disturbed a commissioner's finding of probable cause may
yet, on the same facts, find unwarranted the determination of probable
cause by a police officer who, under no press of urgent circumstances,
arrests without a warrant.

COPYRIG-HT-IssuAxoE

OF CERTIFICATE OF COPYRIGHT
CONDITION PRECEDENT TO INFRINGEMENT ACTION.

HELD

Plaintiff watch company manufactured and sold wrist watch dials on
which the printed figure "@" signified notice of copyright.' After two
successive applications for certificate of registration had been refused by
the Register of Copyrights on the ground that the dial faces were not a fit
subject for protection under the requirements of the Copyright Act,2 plaintiff brought the instant suit for infringement against a competing manufacturer. Holding plaintiff's dials uncopyrightable, the district court granted
defendant's motion to dismiss.3 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed
44. See note 36 supra.
45. For a reversal of a commissioner's finding of probable cause when the complaint contained "no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein; [did] not indicate any sources for the complainant's belief; and [did] not set forth any other sufficient basis upon which a
finding of probable cause could be made," see Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.

480, 486 (1958).

1. Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 19 (1952).
2. Section 4 of the act provides: "The works for which copyright may be secured
shall include all the writings of an author." 17 U.S.C. § 4 (1952).
17 U.S.C.
§ 5 (1952) enumerates thirteen "classes" into which copyright applications may fall,
seventh among which is "works of art," under which the instant plaintiff specified
for copyright. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch
Co., 260 F.2d 637, 639 (2d Cir. 1958). But § 5 further provides that "the above
specifications shall not be held to limit the subject matter of copyright as defined in
section 4 of this title, nor shall any error in classification invalidate or impair the
copyright protection secured under this title." 17 U.S.C. § 5 (1952).
The kind of
subject matter for which copyright is available, then, is controlled by the phrase
"all the writings of an author," in § 4. For the developed judicial interpretation of
the phrase, see, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954) (statuette) ; Boucher v.
DuBoyes, Inc., 253 F2d 948 (2d Cir. 1958) (earrings) ; Produce Reporter Co. v.
Fruit Produce Rating Agency, 1 F.2d 58 (N.D. Ill. 1924) (business directory);
68 HARv. L. RFv. 517 (1955).
3. The plaintiff also brought action for infringement of design patent upon the
same watch and for unfair competition. The district court held summarily that the
design patent was valid and had been infringed. The unfair competition count was
dismissed. Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co.,
155 F. Supp. 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
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the judgment dismissing the copyright infringement complaint.4 Hand, J.,
for the majority, assumed arguendo that plaintiff's dials were copyrightable,
but held that the Register's refusal to grant registration must be reviewed
in an action of "mandamus" as condition precedent to the maintenance of
the infringement suit; I only after issuance of a certificate, as provided by
section 11 of the Copyright Act,0 may a copyright owner bring action
against an alleged infringer.7 Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches,
Inc. v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F.2d 637 (2d Cir. 1958).8
The Copyright Act was designed to grant enforceable rights to authors
and publishers in order to afford greater encouragement to the publication
of literary work of lasting benefit to the public.9 To effectuate this purpose,
the act embodies a comprehensive, detailed scheme whereby an author may
"secure" copyright by publication and notice, 10 and "register" his claim
by depositing copies of his work in the copyright office together with an
application for registration." While a potential infringer is put on notice
that a claim to copyright exists at the time claimant "secures" his copyright,12 the formal registration process, culminating in the issuance of a
certificate of copyright, is designed to assure that the copyright holder make
available for public record his identity, the title and nature of the work,
4. Dismissal of the unfair competition count was not appealed. Summary judgment on the design patent infringement action was reversed and remanded for the
hearing of expert testimony as to what factors accounted for the commercial success
of the watch. Apparently only Judge Hand was in favor of the remand; Judge Clark
thought plaintiff manifestly not entitled to a design patent and Judge Lumbard
voted to affirm summary judgment for plaintiff on the design patent count, but concurred to send the case back for further hearing as "the only common denominator
on which two of us can agree for disposition of the design patent cause of action."
Vacheron & Constantin-Le Coultre Watches, Inc, v. Benrus Watch Co., 260 F2d 637,
642 (2d Cir. 1958). In dissent, Judge Clark noted: "All the judges who have passed
upon the issues have substantially agreed that copying of plaintiff's watch would call for
some remedial action by the court; but we have disagreed on the rationale to support
this conclusion." Ibid.
5. Liability for infringement is provided by 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
6. Any person entitled to copyright "may obtain registration of his claim to
copyright by complying with the provisions of this title, including the deposit of
copies, and upon such compliance, the Register of Copyrights shall issue to him the
certificates.

. .

."

17 U.S.C. § 11 (1952).

7. The decision rests upon interpretation of § 13 of the act, which provides:
"After copyright has been secured by publication of the work with the notice of

copyright . . . , there shall be promptly deposited in the copyright office . . . two
complete copies . . . , such copies . . . to be accompanied in each case by a claim

of copyright. No action or proceeding shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until the provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of
copies and registration of such work shall have been complied with." 17 U.S.C. § 13

(1952).

8. Judge Clark dissented. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
9. See Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
10. "Any person entitled thereto by this title may secure copyright for his work
by publication thereof with the notice of copyright required by this title; and such
notice shall be affixed to each copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United

States by authority of the copyright proprietor."
11. Note 6 supra.

17 U.S.C. § 10 (1952).

12. See, e.g., Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 40 (1939).

"[P]roper publication gives notice to all the world that immediate copyright exists."

1048

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 107

and the fact and date of publication.' 3 Registration is not prerequisite to
the existence of valid copyright, which is perfected upon publication with
notice; 1- but the act expressly provides that "no action or proceeding
shall be maintained for infringement of copyright in any work until the
provisions of this title with respect to the deposit of copies and registration
of such work shall have been complied with." '5 It is upon interpretation
of this statutory condition precedent to the maintenance of an infringement
suit that the instant decision turns. Plaintiff had indeed "complied with"
all of the conditions of publication and deposit necessary under the act to
obtain a certificate of copyright; the Register, however, had refused to
issue a certificate. Does the act demand affirmative action of the Register,
as well as of the copyright holder, as a precondition of the holder's capacity
effectively to enforce his statutory rights?
What appears to have split the court are divergent views of the scope
of discretion accorded the Register of Copyrights under the copyright
scheme. It is indeed this question upon which, preliminarily, the propriety
of demanding mandamus to force certificate issuance as prerequisite to suit
for infringement will depend. For if the Register had administrative discretion in the award of copyright protection, if he had authority to determine
the right under law of a claimant to secure copyright, if he had executive or
quasi-legislative functions analogous to those of a regulatory agency in
licensing procedures, then for the courts to accord infringement relief to a
claimant to whom a certificate had not been issued would be clear usurpation
of administrative authority. If the act intended that the Register make the
initial decision as to the copyrightability of a work claimed, and intended
that decision to be subject to judicial review only for abuse of discretion,
this intent of the act itself would foreclose a court's grant of relief to the
alleged copyright holder, the legal right for violation of which relief was
sought being dependent for its existence upon the preliminary action of
the Register. Of course, even if such were the scheme of the Copyright
Act, a mandamus-before-infringement rule would not be necessarily dictated. Where the Register had refused copyright within the permissible
scope of his discretion, a court could not by mandamus reverse his administrative judgment; and, if his determination of uncopyrightability were
clearly erroneous as a matter of law-wholly outside the scope of authority
delegated by the statute-then it would be as reasonable for the court to
13. The certificate of registration issued by the Register of Copyrights must
contain this information. 17 U.S.C. § 209. The copyright office is to keep records
containing entries for all works deposited, § 208, and must index and catalogue entries,
§ 210. The records and indexes of the office are open to public inspection, § 212;
certificates of copyright are to be given to any person making application and paying the prescribed fee, § 209. For the benefit of copyright holders, certificates are
made admissible in any court "as prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein."
17 U.S.C. §209 (1952).
14. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 39: "Petitioner's claim
of copyright came to fruition immediately upon publication. Without further notice
it was good against all the world."
15. 17 U.S.C. § 13 (1952).
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assert its review power in an infringement suit as in mandamus. The
only peculiarly appropriate circumstance for mandamus, in fact, would be
where the Register declined to consider an application altogether, not
where, upon consideration, he rejected it. But, in any case, no claim has
ever been made that the Register of Copyrights has such function, authority
or discretion under the act. The statutory command that the register "shall"
issue a certificate upon the applicant's compliance with specified, merely
procedural requirements,"0 the absence of any provision for administrative
hearing or determination of the copyrightability issue, the failure to provide
for allocation of the decision-making function as between agency and
court,17 all indicate a legislative scheme to leave entirely to the judiciary the
interpretation and enforcement of the act. Issuance of certificates seems
clearly intended to be an automatic, routine procedure; the office of the
Register, merely ministerial. Unanimously, to date, the courts have
adjudicated questions of copyrightability as issues of statutory interpretation in infringement suits; never has the issuance of a certificate by the
Register been urged as a binding, or even provisory, administrative determination. 18 Nor has the copyright office itself ever pretended to such a
power. 19 In the one case in which the Register had refused extension of a
copyright after the claimant's compliance with requisite procedures, the
court adjudicated the merits of an infringement suit with a one-sentence
discussion of the legal insignificance of the Register's refusal: plaintiff
"offered registration under the statute, and, although registration was refused, yet it fully complied with the requirements of law, and is entitled to
maintain this suit if it had any statutory right to the extension." 2 0 Although
Judge Hand in the instant case appears to argue for administrative discretion of the Register,21 he nevertheless asserts that the courts could mandamus the Register not merely to consider the application, but to issue a
certificate to an applicant entitled to copyright under law; "the decision
here did not demand the exercise of a discretion that was conclusive with
the Register." 22 It is difficult to understand, then, precisely what kind of
16. 17 U.S.C. § 11 (1952), supra note 6.

17. The provision of § 209 that the certificate shall be prima fade evidence of the
facts stated therein, see note 13 supra, clearly does not constitute the grant of policymaking power to the Register. Aside from the failure of the section to speak to
cases where the Register determines nwt to issue a certificate, it must be noted that
the "facts stated therein" do not include findings of copyrightability or of the applicant's right to copyright, but are limited to a record of the routine details of the
copyright procedure. 17 U.S.C. §209 (1952).
18. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); Continental Cas. Co. v.
Beardsley, 253 F2d 702 (2d Cir. 1958); Guthrie v. Curlett, 36 F.2d 694 (2d Cir.
1929); Trifari, Krussman & Fishel, Inc. v. Charel Co., 134 F. Supp. 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) ; Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 Fed. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921).
19. "We register material which we feel a court might reasonably hold to be
copyrightable, even though, personally, we feel that it is not subject to copyright."
Library of Congress, Departmental and Divisional Mhnuals, No. 7, "Copyright Office"
38 (1950).
20. White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Goff, 187 Fed. 247 (1st Cir. 1911).
21. Instant case at 640.
22. Ibid. "There are no disputed facts; and the mere fact that the meaning of
the phrase 'works of art,' admits of debate does not make it different from many
statutes whose interpretation is every day regarded as reviewable by the courts."
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"discretion" is meant. The only authority relied on by Judge Hand is
what appears to be mere obiter dictum in Bouv6 v. Twentieth Century-Fox
Film Corp.: 3 "[I]t seems obvious that, unless the Register has some
power to control deposits for copyright, it may soon become necessary to
build a new library annex. It seems obvious, also, that the Act establishes
a wide range of selection within which discretion must be exercised by the
Register in determining what he has no power to accept." 24 But in that
case, where the issue was not the Register's power to refuse an application
on grounds of uncopyrightability, but his power to refuse registration as a
book of a work he deemed a collection of periodical articles, the court held
that, even within this more restricted area of function, it was the court, not
the Register, which must make the statutory determination. "If the
deposited material was and is a book, then the fee which was tendered was
sufficient and [the Register's] duty to register was imperative and unIbid. Judge Hand is here arguing that the Register would be subject to mandamus.
But the argument that the Register has no such discretion as would prevent a court
from ordering that he issue a certificate seems also to prove that he has no decisionmaking functions under the act. The determination of copyrightability is always a
question of law; the application of the statute to the work in hand. If the courts may,
interpreting the act, make this determination in each case, what remains within the
Register's "discretion"?
23. 122 F2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
24. Id. at 53. Judge Hand argues that Bouvr, in which mandamus issued against
the Register, constitutes a holding that, in the absence of issuance of a certificate,
plaintiff copyright holder would have been unable to maintain an infringement suit.
His reasoning is that mandamus, as an extraordinary remedy which "should not go
when another adequate remedy exists," instant case at 640, would not have issued if
an action of infringement lay in which plaintiff could otherwise have raised the
registration issue. But, even assuming the extraordinary nature of mandamus (the
point was not raised in Bouvr), Hand's argument assumes that opportunity to argue
the registration issue in an infringement suit would be an "adequate" remedy for
refusal of registry. But what was at issue in Bouvi was a refusal to register as a
book, upon payment of the two-dollar book fee; the Register insisted that plaintiff's
work was a collection of twenty contributions to periodicals, each of which must be
separately registered, at an aggregate fee of forty dollars. If the court refused
mandamus, plaintiff would have either to pay out the larger fee as a precautionary
measure or tender the two-dollar fee and run the risk that the Register's interpretation was wrong; there would be no way for plaintiff to be sure that he had in
fact tendered the fees appropriate to deposit, which act of tender, independent of any
action by the Register, is a condition precedent to an infringement suit. Even outside
of this immediate context, moreover, Hand's argument seems bottomed upon the
assumption that there is no other advantage to the copyright holder of possessing
a certificate than the advantage which would lie if the courts in fact held possession
of such a certificate the necessary precondition of an infringement suit. But other
advantages are apparent in the provisions of the act. See §209 (certificate prima
facie evidence of facts stated therein); § 109 (copyright office to certify to Post
Office and Treasury Department copyright claimant's compliance with registration
requirements for purpose of instituting import controls).
Hand also argues that actual issuance of a certificate is a condition precedent
to an infringement suit, by reasoning from a reading of § 13, see note 15 supra and
accompanying text, denying the right to sue "until the provisions of this title with
respect to the deposit of copies and registration of such work shall have been coinplied with." Since "deposit" includes submission of application and the paying of
requisite fees, Hand finds no added condition for "registration" but acceptance by
the Register. Instant case at 640-41. But if there are no other conditions for registration than deposit, then the language of § 11 becomes in part meaningless: "Such
person may obtain registration of his claim to copyright by complying with the provisions of this title, including the deposit of copies . . . . " 17 U.S.C. § 11 (1952).
One such "provision," undoubtedly, is the affidavit required by § 17 as accompanying
"the copies so deposited." 17 U.S.C. § 17 (1952).
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qualified. The only remaining question, therefore, is whether, within the
meaning of the Act, the material is a book. This is a question of law." 25
Holding that the work was a book, and finding that "the Register . . 2 .6
has refused to perform a ministerial duty imposed upon him by the law,"
the court affirmed an order of mandamus to issue the certificate. Careful
reading of the passage in which the opinion speaks of the Register's
discretion seems to indicate that what the court was worried about was
that its holding might be read as denying to the Register all authority to
prevent the cluttering of the copyright office by refusing to register works
which he knew that the courts would hold uncopyrightable; the court did
not wish to withdraw all power of selection "in determining what he has
no power to accept." 27 The opinion appears in no sense to consider
"discretion" in the more usual administrative sense of the term; there was
no question of the Register's authority to make a binding decision of law.
But if it be true, then, that, as Clark, J., writes in dissent, "the
Register must carry out the provisions of the law and has no judicial or
. , 28 what is gained by forcing plaintiff copydiscretionary functions
right holder to establish in a mandamus action an issue of statutory interpretation which the court itself is entirely competent to adjudicate within
the infringement suit and which, if the alleged infringer desires, will only
have to be relitigated in the infringement suit at any rate? 2 9 The Register's
issuance of a certificate will not bind the courts; nor will the mandamus
judgment be res judicata as against the alleged infringer, not party defendAn adverse judgment would, of course, be
ant to the mandamus action 3
31
res judicata against plaintiff, and this is perhaps the only significant justification for the mandamus-before-infringement rule. It throws upon the
government, rather than the alleged infringer, the burden of initially contesting plaintiff's right to copyright protection; by screening out those cases
in which decision can be rested upon the ground of noncopyrightability, it
may save a number of individual potential defendants the expense and effort
25. Bouv6 v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 122 F.2d 51, 54 (D.C.
Cir. 1941). "But assuming that [the Register] has full power to classify deposited
material, still, this gives him no power to refuse registration of a claim of copyright, which has already been secured by publication and notice; if the claim is based
upon material which is actually the subject of copyright." Id. at 54-55.
26. Id. at 56.
27. See text accompanying note 24 supra. (Emphasis added.)
28. Instant case at 645 (dissent).
29. Noncopyrightability will remain a defense to infringement, whether or not
a certificate has been issued. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
30. Nor, unless the infringement suit is also brought in the District of Columbia,
will the mandamus action be even strictly stare decisis as to the infringement suit.
31. Note that if the Bouvi dictum relied upon by Hand, text accompanying note
24 supra, be taken seriously, the issues may be so framed in the mandamus suit that
the mandamus judgment would not be res judicata even as against plaintiff. If the
Register has some discretion, not in the definitive determination of the copyrightability of plaintiff's work, but as to whether the copyright office should issue a certificate, the Register's strongest defense to mandamus is not that the work is not fit
subject for copyright, but that it is not so clearly fit subject for copyright that the
Register abused his discretion in refusing a certificate. If the issues were so formulated, the whole purpose of the mandamus proceeding, even in the Hand view, would
be defeated.
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of taking an infringement case through the courts.32 But inasmuch as the
8
courts have power under the act to award full costs and attorney's fees, 3
it is to be wondered whether any further protection is required for defendants' interests. 34 Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are placed under an extremely onerous burden by the rule of the instant case. A copyright claimant to whom the Register refuses a certificate must bring two separate suits.
One will of necessity be in the District of Columbia. He can recover no
costs or litigation expenses against the government.3 5 And, should the
mandamus action consume a substantial period of time in transit through
the courts, the claimant may find his infringement cause barred by the three
year statute of limitations.3 6 To protect himself from the possible future
32. But the extent to which the rule would in fact deter private litigation may
be questioned. Frequently a claimant whose claim to copyright protection has been
denied by the courts in the preliminary mandamus proceeding will nevertheless bring
an action of unfair competition on the same facts. A recent New York decision, for
example, holds that action for unfair competition will lie for commercial immorality.
Dior v. Milton, 9 Misc. 2d 425, 155 N.Y.S.2d 443 (Sup. Ct. 1956). In the instant
case, plaintiff brought a count of infringement of design patent as well as counts of
unfair competition and copyright infringement. It seems that initial screening of
plaintiff's copyright cause would not have kept this defendant out of the courts.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1952).
34. Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) held that "a reasonable attorney's fee" as provided by 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1952), "is properly awarded
when the infringement action has been commenced in bad faith, . . . where plaintiff's
claim is so lacking in merit as to present no arguable question of law or genuine
issue of fact." The court allowed fees totalling $3,000.
35. 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1952).
36. 17 U.S.C. § 115(b) (Supp. V, 1958). That the statute would run from the
date of the infringing publication, notwithstanding claimant's statutory incapacity to
maintain suit until he had procured a certificate of copyright seems implied in the
copyright procurement scheme. See notes 14, 15, supra and accompanying text. A
claimant's copyright is "secured" by publication with notice; his right to noninfringement arises immediately, and a claim accrues at the date of publication of the infringing work. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30 (1939). The
disability to sue which the instant case would derive from the language of § 13, has
been uniformly held, in other cases of incomplete registration under § 13, merely to
postpone claimant's standing to recover judgment on his otherwise valid claim.
Completion of the registration process subsequent to the time of infringement, and
even subsequent to institution of suit for infringement, permits recovery for infringing
publication prior to the date of effective registration. Washingtonian Publishing Co.
v. Pearson, sipra. Cf. Lumiere v. Path6 Exch., Inc., 275 F. 428 (2d Cir. 1921);
Algonquin Music, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 93 F. Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; Rosedale v. News Syndicate Co., 39 F. Supp. 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). And if the doctrine
of these decisions were overruled and recovery for infringing publication prior to the
completion of registration altogether barred, the mandamus-before-infringement rule
would be equally baneful to copyright claimants. True, in such case, claimants
would not lose their damage claims by operation of the statute of limitations; but
they would never have acquired those damage claims in the first place. All infringement prior to the entry of judgment in claimants' actions of mandamus for copyright
certificate would be wholly immunized from civil liability.
It may be argued from the Luniere, Algonquin and Rosedale cases that where
a claimant has not yet completed the registration process, a proper course would be
to retain jurisdiction in his infringement suit and to permit his further prosecution
of it upon supplemental pleading disclosing his present holding of a certificate of
copyright. See Clark, J., dissenting, instant case at 646. While this might be a
reasonable procedure where the Register has merely not yet acted upon an application for certificate, it seems inexpeditious where the Register has refused a certificate upon a ground of law which must, in any event, be judicially examined.
Multiplication of litigation is avoided by adjudication of all controlling issues in the
single infringement suit. But if the two-suit rule of the instant case be adopted,
a taking and retention of jurisdiction of the infringement suit pending completion of
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bar of the statute, the claimant is forced to mandamus the Register as soon
as is practicable after refusal of an application; in no other way can his
rights under the act be made immediately enforceable. Yet in most cases
no infringement or attempt to infringe will ever in fact be made; mandamus
will have been, practically, a matter of entirely wasted time and expense.
In view, then, both of its futile duplication of judicial effort and of its
serious obstruction to effective enforcement of claimants' copyright protection, the two-suit rule of the instant case seems ill-consonant with the
legislative purpose "to grant valuable, enforceable rights . . . without

burdensome requirements." 37 The intent of section 13's provisional bar of
infringement action 38 is not to immunize the infringer, 39 but to promote
the claimant's fulfilment of the registration procedures. 4° Once that claimant has done all that is necessary and all that is possible toward securing
a certificate under the act, the congressional aim is achieved; the claimant
himself has "complied" with the provisions of the act "with respect to the
deposit of copies and registration." 41 The issue of the compliance or noncompliance of the Register 4 should not be permitted to impede the
claimant's rights.

EQUAL PR OTECTION-PREDOMINANTLY NEGRO SCHOOL WITH
LESS THAN PROPORTIONATE NUMBER OF LICENSED TEACHERS
DENIED EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY ATD BARRED ADJUDICATION OF NEGLECT FOR WITHDRAWAL OF CHILD FROM SCHOOL

Respondent parents were brought before a Domestic Relations Court
of the City of New York and charged with neglect of their twelve-year-old
daughter by refusing to send her to Junior High School 136,1 a school
the mandamus proceeding, might save claimant from the statute of limitations. The
chief difficulty with this resolution is that, once it is decided that the Register's
issuance of a certificate is part of that compliance with the registration provisions
which § 13 demands as condition precedent to infringement suit, note 15 supra, it
becomes hard to justify the infringement court's retention of jurisdiction. In fact,
in Algonquin and Rosedale jurisdiction was not retained; the courts dismissed without
prejudice on finding that, to date of ruling, plaintiff was unable to plead supplementally facts which would indicate compliance with the registration requirements.
37. Washingtonian Publishing Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 36 (1939).
38. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
39. See note 10-14 spra and accompanying text, and note 36 supra.
40. See note 13 .upra and accompanying text.
41. See text accompanying note 15 suPra.
42. See note 6 su pra.
1. School attendance is required by N.Y. EDuC. LAw §3205 which provides:
"In each school district of the state each minor from seven to sixteen years of age
shall attend upon full time day instruction. . . ." N.Y. EDUc. LAW §3212 ordains
parental responsibility for seeing that this instruction is provided, and N.Y.C. DoM.
REL. CT. Acr § 61 confers upon the Children's Court jurisdiction to adjudicate as
"neglected" a child under sixteen years of age who is unlawfully kept out of school.
N.Y.C. DoM. REL. CT. Acr §2(17) (f). If the court adjudicates a child to be
neglected, it may place the child under supervision in its own home or in the custody
of a relative or other fit person, may commit the child to a state institution or
authorized agency, and may "render such other and further judgment or make such
other order or commitment as the court may be authorized by law to make." N.Y.C.
DoM. REL. CT. Acr § 83 (b) (c) (f). Whenever a parent or guardian is before the court,
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located in an almost exclusively Negro and Puerto Rican residential district. 2 The parents contended that their child's constitutionally guaranteed
rights to equal protection of the laws would be violated if attendance at
that school were compelled,3 basing their contention on the fact that there
was a lesser percentage of licensed teachers 4 on its staff than on the
staffs of the schools located in predominantly white residential areas. 5 The
court attributed this unequal distribution to the school board's former
policy of allowing teachers to choose from a city-wide list of vacancies
the school at which they would teach and rejected as insufficient the board's
current remedial policy of assigning newly licensed teachers to specific
schools where they were most needed. Holding that the existence of the
disproportionate distribution violated the child's right to equal educational
opportunity, the court barred the adjudication of neglect.0 In the Matter
of Skipwith, 14 Misc. 2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1958).
it may also, if it appears that the conduct of the parent has contributed to the child's
neglect, "issue a written order specifying conduct to be followed by such parent,
guardian or other person having custody of the child with respect to such child . . .
such as would reasonably prevent . . . neglect as defined by statute." N.Y.C. Dom.
RF. CT. Acr § 83(i). Willful violation of such an order is punishable as criminal
contempt by fine not exceeding two hundred and fifty dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding thirty days, or botl Ibid.
2. Of 1585 students in P.S. 136, 98.4% (1566) were Negro and 1.6% (19) were
Puerto Rican. There are nine junior high schools in New York City in which the
student population is over 95% Negro and Puerto Rican. In forty junior high
schools the student population is over 95% white. See instant case at 335, 180
N.Y.S.2d at 863, and appendices.
3. Respondents acknowledged their failure to send their children to school and
did not offer as defenses those reasons provided by the statute as acceptable. See
N.Y. Euc. LAw § 3218 (physical and mental inability of children); §§ 3210(2) (a),
3212(2) (d) (attendance upon instruction elsewhere); § 3216 (certified employment).
4. The educational requirements for a regularly licensed teacher are set forth
in New York, N.Y., Bd. of Educ. By-Laws, art. XII, §§332-332(a). See also note
28 infra.
5. The percentage of vacancies (defined as authorized positions not filled by
regularly licensed teachers) in schools attended by over 95% Negro-Puerto Rican
and over 95% white, respectively, reported according to Borough, was as follows:
Manhattan, 48.8% and 28%; Bronx, 55% and 29%; Brooklyn, 58% and 31.6%; Queens,
33% and 27.8%. See appendix to instant case. 34% of the teaching positions
throughout the city junior high schools were at the time listed as vacant. The
schools made efforts to fill these vacancies with non-licensed "substitutes."
6. The court rejected the board's contention that constitutional objections could
not properly be raised until the respondents had exhausted their administrative
remedies in accordance with N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 310, which provides that "any person
conceiving himself aggrieved may appeal or petition to the commissioner of education who is hereby authorized and required to examine and decide the same; and
the commissioner of education may also institute such proceedings as are authorized
under this article and his decision in such appeals, petitions or proceedings shall be
final and conclusive, and not subject to question or review in any place or court
whatever. . . ." The rejection finds support in established New York law (see
McMaster v. Owens, 192 Misc. 687, 81 N.Y.S.2d 564 (Sup. Ct. 1948); Jacobson v.
Board of Educ., 177 Misc. 809, 31 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct. 1941), inodified and af'd,
265 App. Div. 837, 37 N.Y.S2d 647, appeal denied, 265 App. Div. 935, 39 N.Y.S.2d
416 (1942); Sokolove v. Board of Educ., 176 Misc. 1016, 29 N.Y.S.2d 581 (Sup. Ct.
1941) ; Moses v. Board of Educ., 127 Misc. 477, 217 N.Y. Supp. 265 (Sup. Ct. 1926),
aff'd, 218 App. Div. 811, 218 N.Y. Supp. 827, rev'd on other grounds, 245 N.Y. 106,
156 N.E. 631 (1927)), in Supreme Court decisions (see Estep v. United States, 327
U.S. 114 (1947); Township v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946); compare Allen v.
Grand Central Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954)), and in the authorities (see DAvis,
ADmINISTRAvIWE LAW §§ 188-90 (1951); Stason, Timing of Judicial Redress from
Errmotem s Administrative Actio, 25 MINN. L. RaE. 560 (1951)).

1959]

RECENT CASES

Although the fourteenth amendment was originally construed to extend
to "state" as distinguished from "private" action, 7 subsequent cases have
gradually extended the concept of state action to a point where today
it is of questionable utility as a constitutional guide.8 In recent years the
language has been construed as including all action by agencies of the
state,9 officials acting under color of state power,' 0 private organizations
to whom state functions have been delegated "- or whose operations are at
least in part dependent upon government funds,' 2 and even private action
which is "close, in origin and purpose, to the functions of the public government." 13 It is clear that the assignment of school teachers by the
It is also interesting to note that the court's finding that the inequality of school
personnel constituted a violation of respondents' constitutional rights was based on
the board's own evidence, adduced upon request of the court, after respondents had
rested. Instant case at 340, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 867. There is some question as to
whether respondents, proponents on the issue of equal protection, had, prior to the
court's request for evidence, satisfied their burden of going forward. See record of
respondents' evidence in instant case at 336-40, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 864-67. However,
it appears settled that a judge does have at least discretionary power to request
evidence to further develop or clarify issues raised by the parties. United States v.
Marzano, 149 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1945) ; Anderson v. State, 35 Ala. App. 111, 44 So.
2d 266 (1950) ; Moore v. Sykes' Estate, 167 Miss. 212, 149 So. 789 (1933). It has
even been intimated that under certain circumstances such judicial intervention is mandatory. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's dissent in Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 46,
50 (1948). The policy considerations involved are particularly highlighted in the instant
case. On the one hand, judicial intervention of this sort will help to cure such defects
of the adversary system as inequalities, between the parties, of financial means,
abilities of counsel, or access to evidence. On the other hand, judicial intervention
conflicts with our theory of the adversary system and with the usual presumption
of counsel's competence. See generally 9 WGaEtoR, EvIDEmcE § 2484-87 (3d ed.
1940) ; Wyzanski, A Trial Judges Freedom and Respomibility, 65 HAav. L. Rxv.
1281, 1293-94 (1952) ; Note, The Trial Judge's Use of His Power to Call Witiwsses
-An Aid to Adversary Presentation, 51 Nw. U.L. REV. 761 (1957).
7. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See also Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1879), which had previously decided that the concept of state action included
executive and judicial, as well as legislative, action.
8. See Morse, Policy and the Fourteenth Amezdmevnt: A New Semantics, 27
FORDHA.S L. REv. 187 (1958).
But see reply thereto, Manning, State Responibility
Under the FourteenthAtmendment: An Adherence to Tradition, 27 FoanuAm L. REv.
201 (1958). See also Note, The Disintegration of a Cowept-State Action Under
the 14th and 15th Amendmtts, 96 U. PA. L. Rsv. 402 (1948).
9. In an early case, Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 313, 318 (1879), the
Court stated that "it is, doubtless, true, that a State may act through different agencies,
-either by its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities; and the prohibitions
of the amendment extend to all action of the State denying equal protection of the
laws, whether it be action by one of these agencies or another." See Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (state court) ; Missouri v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938)
(curators of state university); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278
(1913) (municipal corporation); Raymond v. Chicago Union Traction Co., 207 U.S.
20 (1907) (tax board); Reagen v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894)
(public service commission).
10. For examples see Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879) (state judge);
United States v. Sutherland, 37 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Ga. 1940) (police officer).
This extension has followed along the lines of respondeat superior. See Note, The
Disintegration of a Concept-State Action Under the 14th and 15th Amendmmts,
96 U. PA. L. REV. 402, 406 (1948).
11. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) ; Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) ; Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th
Cir. 1947). Cf. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W. Va. 1948).
12. Kerr v. Enoch Pratt Free Library, 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945).
13. Nash v. Air Terminal Servso, 85 F. Supp. 545, 5449 (E.D. Va. 1949):
'We do not hold that Air Terminal was an air carrier, or engaged in air trans-
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Board of Education is the exercise of a governmental function within the
developed limits of the state action concept. 14 It is no less state action when
a proper function is delegated, as it was in the instant case, by allowing
licensed teachers to choose from available positions. 15 Whatever the
method employed, the actual resultant allocation of government employed
staff must be charged to the responsibility of the state. The constitutional
question, then, is whether such disparities of access to licensed teaching
personnel as were found to exist in fact among the various New York
City schools constitute that discriminatory treatment of persons similarly
situated 16 which would violate respondents' right to equal protection of
17
the laws.
Questions of equality of educational opportunity had often been considered by the courts under the "separate but equal" doctrine '8 in cases
testing whether colored schools segregated by action of state law met that
then-accepted constitutional standard. While the lower federal courts and
state courts had taken positions that had varied from demanding absolute
equality 19 to allowing segregation except where the facilities were so
manifestly inferior as to necessarily impede the educational progress of the
individual complainant, 20 the Supreme Court had applied a rule of "substantial equality." 21 Thus, the Court had held that a disparity in reputation and numbers of faculty, position and influence of alumni, and prestige
of the school in the community were factors significant in judging equality
of educational opportunity. 2 The doctrine had also been strictly applied
in the comparison of physical facilities; substantial equivalence was reportation; we do hold its restaurants are too close, in origin and purpose, to the
functions of the public government to allow them the right to refuse service without
good cause." See also Plummer v. Casey, 148 F. Supp. 326 (S.D. Tex. 1955), aff'd
sub noin. Derrington v. Plummer, 240 F2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 924 (1957).
14. See cases cited notes 9-13 supra.
15. See cases cited note 11 supra. The instant court puts the case cogently: "The
Board of Education can no more plead not guilty than could the Police Commissioner
if he allowed patrolmen to choose not to accept dangerous or unpleasant assignments." Instant case at 334, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 872.
16. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886).
17. "[Nor] shall any State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 1.
18. The doctrine was first formulated in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)
(sustaining a Louisiana statute requiring separate railroad accommodations for
Negroes and whites), and subsequently applied to the following cases involving educational facilities: vlcaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ; Sipuel v. Board of Educ., 332 U.S. 631 (1948) ;
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
19. E.g., Wilson v. Board of Supervisors, 92 F. Supp. 986 (E.D. La.), aff'd per
curiam, 340 U.S. 909 (1950); McCready v. Byrd, 195 Md. 131, 73 A.2d 8 (1950);
State ex rel. Brewton v. Board of Educ., 361 Mo. 86, 233 S.W.2d 697 (1950).
20. E.g., Gebhart v. Belton, 33 Del. Ch. 196, 91 A.2d 137 (Sup. Ct.1952) (seonble)
(nominal utilization of the "substantial equality" standard), rev'd on, other grounods
sub nn., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938):
"[Petitioner] was entitled to the equal protection of the laws, and the State was
bound to furnish him within its borders facilities for legal education substantially
equal to those which the State there afforded for persons of the white race...
22. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

1959]

RECENT CASES

quired in the nature and condition of heating plants,2 modern and adequate
automatic flush toilets,2 4 indoor drinking fountains,2 and teachers' rest
rooms.2 6 In the instant case, from evidence of a significantly lower lercentage of licensed teachers among the active teaching personnel 2 7 and of
the board's more stringent requirements for obtaining a license than for
teaching as a substitutes 8 an inferiority of teaching staff in the predominantly non-white schools may be inferred. 29 Such a disproportionate distribution of teaching abilities would certainly seem to fall afoul of the
"substantial equality" test applied in the foregoing cases.
However, the court found that, unlike the segregation cases, there was
here no separation of the races attributable to government action.3 0 Race
grouping was a function of city residence pattern alone. In such instances,
where without governmental compulsion there have arisen clearly divided,
reasonably permanent areas of exclusively white or Negro housing, the
courts have so far held the resulting "de facto" school segregation itself
not violative of the fourteenth amendment's non-segregation command
announced in Brown.3 1 Similarly it might be argued that where the government has not decreed separation of the races, a more flexible constitutional standard, one requiring less than the substantial equality demanded
by the Court under Plessy,32 is applicable to determine the constitutional
infirmity of inter-school variations of quality. Where a state had voluntarily chosen to classify and separate its citizens, it was not unreasonable
23. Freeman v. County Board, 82 F. Supp. 167 (E.D. Va. 1948).
24. Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Pitts v.
Board of Trustees, 84 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Ark 1949).
25. Pitts v. Board of Trustees, upra note 24.
26. Davis v. County School Bd., 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952); Butler v.
Wilemon, 86 F. Supp. 397 (N.D. Tex. 1949).
27. See note 5 supra.
28. For example, thirty hours of graduate courses are required of regularly
licensed teachers of general subjects, but none are required of substitutes. See New
York, N.Y., Bd. Educ. By-Laws art. XII, §§ 332-32a.
29. There may be reasons other than insufficient experience or ability why a
teacher is precluded from obtaining his or her license, or will prefer to teach as a
substitute. There was no evidence of inferiority in the teaching staff of Junior
High School 136 other than what might be inferred from the statistics set forth in
note 5 supra and from several board commissions opining that the inferiority of a
portion of the city's schools was in part attributable to a relatively larger percentage
of substitute teachers. The court itself had no hesitation in making the express
finding that, "so long as non-white or X schools have a substantially smaller proportion of regularly licensed teachers than white or Y schools, discrimination and
inferior education, apart from that inherent in residential patterns, will continue."
Instant case at 343, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 871. For purposes of this comment, inferiority
will be assumed.
30. Instant case at 336, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 863-64.
31. See, e.g., Henry v. Godsell, 165 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1958) where the
choice of school sites was based upon density of population and geographical considerations such as distance, accessibility, ease of transportation, and other safety
considerations. Cf. Holland v. Board of Public Instruction, 258 F2d 730 (5th Cir.
1958) ; Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956). The amendment
does not in terms command integration, but merely prohibits governmentally sanctioned segregation. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), tolling the
end of the epoch of "separate but equal."
32. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). See notes 18-26 supra and accompanying text.
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to demand the most scrupulous state care to ensure equality of opportunity
in treatment accorded the groups. But states must have more leeway and
discretion in adjustment of the inevitably recurrent disequilibria of their
chance population distribution. The difficulties that inhere in efficient
administration and practical operation of a modern metropolitan school system, especially, appear to make this flexibility a necessity. In every metropolitan area there are some school districts which offer less desirable teaching positions than others-the depressed areas which contain "difficult"
schools. Often, as in the instant case, these districts will tend to demarcation along racial lines. In an attempt to administer the school system in
the manner most consistent with high educational standards, a board is
faced with the very difficult problem of reconciling the need to attract
competent personnel for the school system as a whole with the need to
supply instruction in areas where many teachers, quite aside from racial
feeling, do not want to work. In making adjustments to particular local
conditions and in balancing peculiar local needs, school boards should not
be subject to judicial demands for immediate "substantial" equality. Efforts
which in good faith are reasonably calculated to achieve the highest quality
of each particular school which is practicably compatible with an adequate
standard of quality throughout all the schools, should be tolerated. To call
unreasonable the provisional attempt of the New York City board to cope
with its own problems, in a time of acute teacher shortage,33 by permitting
teachers to elect the school of their preference, seems itself unreasonable.
Still more should a measure of practical inequality be tolerated, at least for
a while, where the board has already instituted, on its own initiative, a
remedial system of new allocations which will advance toward equality without the perhaps seriously disruptive effects of immediate teacher reassignment. In sum, the realities that face the board should dictate that that
equality demanded by the Constitution be an equality achievable within
the confines of a viable system. By such a test, New York would not
have violated respondents' right of equal protection.
But even if the extant New York system be assumed to offend that
right, respondent has not yet carried his case. The instant court concludes
without discussion that, once the educational establishment be held violative
of equal protection under the Constitution, any court which failed to permit
the setting up of such unconstitutionality as an affirmative defense to
adjudication of neglect would itself be "violating the Constitution." 34 Yet,
to step from the holding that respondents have the constitutional right to
33. At the time of the trial, thirty-four per cent of the teaching positions throughout the city junior high schools were being filled by substitutes. Instant case at 339,
180 N.Y.S.2d at 867.
34. Instant case at 335, 180 N.Y.S.2d at 863. The court's citation of Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), as authority for this proposition seems unconvincing.
Shelley establishes that sone actions of a state court, as distinguished from the state
legislative and executive arms, may constitute state action violative of the fourteenth
amendment. The question remains whether any particular act of a state court is,
substantively, so violative. See Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434 (1958),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nora. Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of
City Trusts, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).

1959]
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object to the present structure of the school system, to the proposition that
they have also "the constitutionally guaranteed right to elect no education
for their children rather than to subject them to discriminatorily inferior
education," 35 seems unwarranted. It is true that the Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, in Dobbins v. Contmonwealth,3 6 similarly allowed un-

constitutional inequality of educational facilities to be set up as a defense to
prosecution in enforcement of that state's compulsory school attendance
law. But the Virginia court, in its brief opinion, made no indication that
it thought its result constitutionally compelled. In another context, the
United States Supreme Court has itself held that, where compliance with
an otherwise valid state regulation, allegedly unconstitutional by particularity of its application, would not cause irreparable harm to the individual, the state may compel compliance as a condition of contesting
constitutionality.32 Where other adequate methods of relief from unconstitutional state regulation are made available, the state may deny to a
criminal defendant who has not pursued those methods the right to set up
unconstitutionality of the regulation as a defense to its enforcement 3 The
constitutionality of not permitting the defense depends not upon the
substantive constitutionality of the regulation, but upon the availability
and adequacy of alternative remedies,3 9 upon a balance of the injury which
compliance will cause to the individual with the harm which non-compliance will cause to society.4° In the instant case, alternative remedies
appear to be available. 4 1 And the Brown decision clearly indicates that,
35. Instant case at 345, 180 N.Y.S2d at 873. Admission of the defense "would
itself deny the due process of law also guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id. at 329, 180 N.Y.S2d at 858.
36. 198 Va. 697, 96 S.F.2d 154 (1957).
37. Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953).
38. Ibid. See Douglas, J., concurring in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S.
81, 107 (1943). But compare Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) ; Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945): 56 YALE L.J. 403 (1947).
39. Cf. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944), Rutledge, J., dissenting,
id. at 460, 24 B.U.L. REV. 250 (1944).
40. Compare Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945), with Poulos v. New
Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953). And, analogously, compare Estep v. United States,
327 U.S. 114 (1946), with Falbo v. United States, 320 U.S. 549 (1944).
41. N.Y. EDuc. LAW § 310 provides for administrative remedy by petition to the
commissioner of education. Note 6 supra. Although the act provides that the commissioner's decision is to be "final and conclusive, and not subject to question or
review . . .

,"

there is no question that his administrative determination allegedly

violative of a petitioner's constitutional rights would in fact be reviewed by the New
York courts. Ellis v. Allen, 4 App. Div. 2d 343, 165 N.Y.S2d 624 (1957), appeal
dismissed, 4 N.Y.2d 693, 148 N.E2d 302 (1958). Cf. Ross v. Wilson, 308 N.Y. 605,
127 N.E.Zd 697 (1955) ; Application of Cole, 202 Misc. 1090, 115 N.Y.S2d 751 (Sup.
Ct. 1952); Fabricius v. Graves, 254 App. Div. 19, 3 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1938). And
where executive action in violation of constitutional or statutory limitations is involved,
those courts have traditionally held injunction, mandamus or prohibition to lie.
Cannon v. Towner, 188 Misc. 955, 70 N.Y.S2d 303 (1947); Ellis v. Dixon, 281
App. Div. 987, 120 N.Y.S,2d 854 (1953) (reversing the jurisdictional holding below,
118 N.Y.S.2d 815 (1952)); cases cited supra note 6. (Mandamus and prohibition
have now been abolished, under those names, by N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1283, and
relief formerly available under the writs is now secured by a statutory proceeding
against a body or officer.)
Respondents' most cogent argument would go to the inadequacy, as distinguished
from the unavailability, of these alternative remedies. Pursuit of their rights through
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at least in the analogous area of segregated schooling, the social disruption
which would result from blanket exemption from compulsory school attendance laws so outweighs the harm to students of attendance at temporarily
unconstitutional classes, that such attendance may provisionally be compelled.42 For certainly the doctrine of desegregation "with all deliberate
speed" 43 means nothing if Brown was intended to liberate students of
segregated schools from all legal obligation to attend. Although the
hardship of attendance at inferior schools may be greater than that of
attendance at "separate but equal" schools, respondents in the instant case
have certainly not demonstrated that the former hardship is severe enough
to justify non-attendance. In the absence of such demonstration, it is suggested that the calculus implied in Brown should here control.4 '
This is not to say that, while not constitutionally compelled to admit
the defense, a state court might not, as a matter of state law, read the defense
into the statute.45 The propriety of such reading would depend upon a
the commissioner and the courts, or even (if the doctrine of exhaustion of adminis-

trative remedies be assumed not applicable to the case, see note 6 supra) through
the courts alone, might well, amidst prevailing conditions of docket delay in the
large metropolitan centers, drag out for a period of years longer than the required
period of Junior High School attendance. See State of New York, Report of the
Temporary Commissiom on the Courts, LEG. Doc. No. 6(c) (1957); State of New
York, Report of the Temporary Commision.on the Courts, LEa. Doc. No. 18 (1956)
(recommendations respecting calendar congestion and delay); Nims, The Law's
Delay: The Bar's Most Urgent Problem, 44 A.B.A.J. 27 (1958).
See generally
Warren, The Problem of Delay: A Task for Bench and Bar Alike, 44 A.B.AJ. 1043
(1958) ; Nims, Backlogs: .Tlistice Denied, 42 A.B.A.J. 613 (1956).
Success at the
trial court level would unquestionably be followed by immediate stay pending appeal;
by the time a definitive judgment could be rendered and a decree issued, the child
might be out of school. Quite apart from the possible loss by the parents of their
standing to sue, see Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), the child
would have passed his entire educational period in schools assumedly violative of
his constitutional rights. Although this aspect of inadequacy is a serious contention,
it remains somewhat speculative, and should be rejected by a court until such time
at least as the parents have actually attempted an alternative course of remedy which
in fact is demonstrably delaying. And even were a showing made of such significant
delay as to render alternatives in point of practical fact inadequate as to these particular
parents, it is to be doubted that their exemption from the compulsory school attendance
law would then be constitutionally required. Rather, the Brown decree of "all deliberate speed," see notes 42, 43 infra and accompanying text, seems inescapably to
contain the implication that to force some children, during the initial years of a
school reformation program, to pass the whole of their educational lives in unconstitutional institutions, is not ipso facto a deprivation. of their constitutional rights.
As against the imponderable harm of total disaggregation of the educational system,
Browun would indicate, a sacrifice of remedies which would vindicate the individual
rights of the interregnum children may be permitted.
42. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
43. Id. at 301. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
44. Since the board had already inaugurated a new system of teacher allocation
intended to effect correction of the inequalities in teaching personnel among various
schools, enforcement of attendance at unconstitutionally discriminatory classes would
here, as in the Brown implication, be provisional. Whether the board's new scheme
itself could meet the standard of "all deliberate speed," especially inasmuch as what
is "all deliberate speed" for rectification of a "separate but equal" system may not be
speedy enough for rectification of a system of oppressive inequality, might be contested. It would seem that here no more should be demanded of the board. See
text accompanying and following note 33 supra. But in light of the availability of
administrative and judicial procedures for speeding up the equalization process, in
the event that the board's current practice be adjudged too slow, see note 41 supra,
the adequacy of that current practice, in itself, is not strictly relevant.
45. See generally Annot., 30 A.L.R.2d (1953).

1959]

RECENT CASES

balance of considerations of relative inconvenience similar to those weighed
in the decision of the constitutional issue, but with less severe a burden
upon the complaining individual to show irreparable injury.46 In this
regard, the nature of the instant proceeding is important. In an adjudication of neglect based upon parental failure to have a child "attend upon
instruction," 47 the normal remedial measure would be a court order upon
the parents to send the child to school.48 Criminal sanctions could be
brought to bear on the parents only after their subsequent non-compliance
with the order; there is no question of immediate punishment for past
conduct. On the other hand, if the adjudication of neglect be barred, there
is no way to compel the child's return to school. The competing normative
considerations, then, are susceptible of statement as a single question:
should these parents be compelled to keep their child in school during
whatever period of time is required to secure adjudication of the alleged
constitutional infirmity of the school establishment? While it may be
admitted that, on a showing that conditions in the schools were so positively
injurious as to threaten substantial physical or psychic harm to the child,
parents should not be so compelled, nevertheless, here, there has been no
such showing. The court has not even found that the child would be better
off at home than in Junior High School 136. That conditions in that school
are inferior to those in other schools does not permit the implication that
they are intolerable, or even that they are inferior to the conditions of
non-attendance. On the other hand, the court's decision, which not only
puts the compulsive force of the education laws in abeyance wherever
there is actual inequality, but serves also to put that compulsive force
in question wherever there is a doubt as to equality, opens the way to
mass truancy which may threaten major breakdowns of the city's educational program.4 9 Especially coupled with the court's rigorously demanding standard of equality, 0 such a decision seems dearly unsound.
46. Considerations of local precedent and of the appropriate balance of legislative
and judicial authority are, of course, significant on the issue of whether the court
will read such a defense into a statute. Although the legislative expression of three
explicit statutory defenses, see note 3 supra, might be deemed to exclude all others,
the extent to which New York courts are willing to allow non-statutory defenses to
enforcement of the compulsory education law is uncertain. The appellate division
seems to have recognized such a defense in In re Richards, 255 App. Div. 922, 7
N.Y.S.2d 722, affirming, 166 Misc. 359, 2 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Child. Ct. 1938); other
cases have refused to entertain any but statutory defenses. In re Conlin, 130 N.Y.S2d
811 (Child. Ct. 1954); People v. Himmanen, 108 Misc. 275, 178 N.Y. Supp. 282
(Chemung County Ct. 1919).
47. N.Y. Eiuc. LAw § 3212.
48. Instant case at 329, 180 N.Y.S2d at 857. See note 1 supra.
49. It may be argued that the board can protect itself from this threat by immediate reformation of its system. But, apart from the probable impracticality of
such immediate reformation, see text accompanying notes 30-33 mtpra, an enormous
menace hangs over the board in the future. In the midst of rapidly shifting population
trends and personnel turnovers, it must maintain perpetual equality upon pain of
losing the power to compel attendance. And it should be noted that the very availability of a defense tempts its exploitation, even in cases where it will ultimately fail;
thus, the cohesive force of the compulsory education laws, which lies precisely in
their ubiquitous and unfailing application, is immeasurably weakened.
50. See notes 30-33 supra and accompanying text.
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CONTRACTOR

SUPPLYING MATERIAL FOR CONSTRUCTION OF A STEEL
To AFF-CT INTERSTATE COMMERCE UNDER HOBBS ACT

MmL

HELD

By threatening loss of a subcontract to supply concrete for the construction of a steel processing plant, defendant, a local union official,
received periodic payments from the subcontractor. In an indictment for
extortion under the Hobbs Act,' it was alleged that defendant's acts affected
interstate commerce, in particular the movement of sand to the subcontractor's place of business. At trial evidence was received that some of
the sand did move in interstate commerce. However, basing his charge on
further evidence that when the plant under construction was completed, the
products it would produce would probably move in interstate commerce,
the district judge instructed the jury that if they believed the latter evidence
and that the acts of extortion were committed by defendant, then he found
as a matter of law that defendant's conduct had a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. Upon conviction, defendant appealed, contending
inter alia2 that it had not been shown that interstate commerce had been
affected. The court of appeals held that extortion from a subcontractor
supplying materials for the construction of a plant which, when completed,
would produce goods which, if successfully marketed, would be shipped
out of state, was sufficiently close to interstate commerce to be within
the statutory language of the Hobbs Act. United States v. Stirone, 262
F.2d 571 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. granted, 27 U.S.L. Week 3303 (U.S. April

27, 1959) (No. 722).3
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1952).
In pertinent part, the Act provides: "(a) Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement
of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property
in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall
be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both. . . . (b) As used in this section- . . . (2) The term 'extortion means the
obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use
of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right.
(3) The term 'commerce' means . . . all commerce between any point in a State,
Territory, Possession, or the District of Columbia and any point outside thereof;
. . . and all other commerce over which the United States has jurisdiction."
2. Defendant contended that there had been a fatal variance between indictment
and proof, in that the trial judge asked the jury to find that the plant under construction would probably send goods in interstate commerce, and omitted to charge,
as the indictment alleged, that the extortion affected the supply of sand to the victim.
The court held on the authority of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935),
that as defendant was not surprised by the evidence on this issue there had been
no substantial prejudice. Instant case at 574. Defendant also contended that the
reception, in rebuttal, of evidence of similar offenses committed after the extortion
in question, was reversible error. The court held that evidence of other offenses
was admissible if relevant for any purpose other than propensity to rommit the
crime, and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting this evidence
to show intent, plan, or scheme on the part of the defendant. Instant case at 576-77.
3. The opinion of the district court may be found in 168 F. Supp. 490 (W.D.
Pa. 1957).

RECENT CASES

The detection and prosecution of racketeering has been a concern of
federal law enforcement agencies since the 1920's.4 Prior to the AntiRacketeering Act of 1934,6 prosecution of criminal conduct affecting interstate commerce had been attempted under the Sherman Act. This had
proved unsatisfactory due to the difficulty, in many cases, of proving the
requisite conspiracy 6 The Anti-Racketeering Act proscribed robbery and
extortion that in any way affected interstate commerce, defining commerce
to include all commerce over which the United States had jurisdiction.7
The courts interpreted the act as reaching to the limit of Congress' constitutional power. 8 Under the Hobbs Act, successor to the Anti-Racketeering Act, the substantive crime remained the same: penalties were prescribed
for anyone who "in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce by
robbery or extortion. .

.

."

o In most of the cases reaching the appellate

level under both acts the question as to whether the particular activity in
fact affected interstate commerce has presented little difficulty.' 0 The
4. See note 6 infra.

5. Ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979.
6. See A Note on the Racketeering, Bank Robbery, and "Kick-Back" Laws,

1 LAW & CONTEmP. PROB. 445 (1934).

7. Ch. 569, 48 Stat 979 (1934).

Discussing this provision, a contemporary writer

commented: "The . . . words . . . ['any way affecting'] must be contrasted with

the insistence heretofore evident in the opinions of the Supreme Court that only such
intra-state activities come within the commerce power of Congress as operate to
obstruct or burden interstate commerce 'directly,' 'substantially,' or 'unduly,' to select
but three of the most commonly employed restrictive adverbs." (Footnotes omitted.)
A Note on the Racketeering, Bank Robbery, and "Kick-Back" Laws, 1 LAW &
CONTMMI'. PRon. 445, 447 (1934).
8. See, e.g., Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 687 (1941).
9. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1952). The potential scope of the Anti-Racketeering Act
was limited by two provisos: one exempted labor organization activity from the act's
coverage-specifically, attempts by a bona fide employee to obtain wages from a bona
fide employer; the other limited prosecutions to those initiated by the express direction of the Attorney General of the United States. No controversy surrounded the
act until after United States v. Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521
(1942), in which it was held that the forced "hiring" of local teamsters by all
truckers utilizing the Holland Tunnel was exempted from coverage of the act under
the section excluding attempts by bona fide employees to obtain wages from a bona
fide employer. Several legislative attempts were made to overrule this case. See
H.R. 653, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943); S. 2347, ILR. 7067, 77th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1942). See also Federal Legislation, 35 GEo. L.J. 362 (1947). Finally, over the
opposition of those who termed the bill an anti-labor measure (see debate in Congress on H.R. 32, 79th Cong., Ist Sess., 91 CoNG. REc. 11839-48, 11899-922 (1945)),
the present Hobbs Act was passed in 1946. The substantive crime remained the
same in the new bill, but the direct exemption of labor organization activity was
omitted, and the requirement that only the Attorney General could initiate prosecutions was eliminated. Pertinent parts of the text are reproduced in note 1 supra.
For a discussion of the extortion provisions see Note, 101 U. PA. L. REv. 1030
(1953). F6r an examination of the robbery provision of the act see Note, 67 YALE
LJ. 325 (1957).
10. In some of these cases, the question whether commerce had been affected
was not directly in issue on appeal. See United States v. Postma, 242 F.2d 488
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 922 (1957); United States v. Varlack, 225 F.2d
665 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v. Kemble, 198 F.2d 889 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
344 U.S. 893 (1952).
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extortion or robbery in several cases was directed against persons whose
business involved shipment of goods in interstate commerce; 11 in another
series of cases, the victims were engaged, respectively, in work on interstate pipelines, 12 and on a levee for a river that was "unquestionably an
interstate commerce highway." 1 In still another prosecution, the victims
exhibited motion pictures that had been in interstate commerce and, upon
reconsignment, continued to travel in interstate commerce.' 4 Two cases
concerned extortions from contractors or subcontractors constructing plants
that would produce goods likely to move in interstate commerce.,; The
commerce alleged and proved to be affected in these cases, however, was
similar to that which had been alleged in the indictment in the instant case:
the stoppage of supplies shipped from other states to the victim. Thus,
had the jury in the instant case been charged in accordance with the indictment, current authority is clear that a conviction would be upheld.16
But no reported decisions under the Hobbs Act have yet gone so far as
to sustain convictions based upon prospective effect on goods subsequently
to be produced for shipment in interstate commerce.
In holding that the extortion in the instant case affected commerce
sufficiently to fall within the scope of congressional regulation, the court
11. United States v. Local 807, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 315 U.S. 521 (1942) ;
United States v. Postma, supra note 10; United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882 (1956); United States v. Varlack, oupra
note 10; United States v. Kemble, supra note 10; United States v. Nedley, 153 F.
Supp. 887 (W.D. Pa. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 255 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1958);
United States v. Malinsky, 19 F.R.D. 426 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). In Anderson v. United
States, 264 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1959), a plastering contractor had, in preparation
for a job, sent materials in interstate commerce.
12. United States v. Lowe, 234 F.2d 919 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838
(1956); United States v. Floyd, 228 F.2d 913 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 938
(1956); Calanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862
(1955); Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 183 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 915
(1955).
13. United States v. Green, 246 F.2d 155, 160 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 871
(1957) (quotation from trial court's charge). See also United States v. Green,
350 U.S. 415 (1956), reversing, 135 F. Supp. 162 (S.D. Ill. 1955).
14. United States v. Compagna, 146 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324
U.S. 867 (1945) ; Nick v. United States, 122 F.2d 660 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 314
U.S. 687 (1941).
15. United States v. Dale, 223 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1955) (request for bail after
conviction, interstate commerce not directly discussed); Hulahan v. United States,
214 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954). See also United States v.
Palmiotti, 254 F.2d 491 (2d Cir. 1958).
16. Hulahan v. United States, supra note 15. The court in the Hulahan case
stated the issues in an extremely broad form: "It seems apparent from the language
of the statute that it was the intent of Congress to protect interstate commerce
against extortion or attempted extortion which in any way or any degree reasonably
could be regarded as affecting such commerce. The exaction of tribute from contractors engaged in local construction work who are dependent upon interstate commerce for materials, equipment and supplies, or who are engaged in constructing
facilities to serve such commerce, is, in our opinion, proscribed by the statute in suit."
Id. at 445. Two of the victims of the defendant's extortion received their supplies
for construction from interstate commerce, and a third was constructing an improved
runway for an airport serving air commerce. Id. at 443. Sustaining jurisdiction,
the court indicated that congressional power over extortion was co-extensive with
its power in the field of labor relations. Id. at 445.
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relied on several cases decided under the Fair Labor Standards Act.",
Unlike the Hobbs Act, the terms of this statute do not extend federal
jurisdiction to the constitutional limit; it covers only those employers "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." Is If
the potential power of Congress over commerce is in no way dependent
upon the sphere or the nature of the activity regulated, then any particular
fact situation held to be within the scope of the narrower FLSA would
a fortiori "affect commerce" for purposes of the Hobbs Act. But even if
this be so, the cases relied upon by the court appear distinguishable from the
instant case. In the Vollmzer 19 case the Supreme Court, holding that work
on construction of a new lock to be a part of the Gulf Intercoastal Waterway
was within the FLSA as "in practical effect, a part of . . . [interstate
commerce], rather than an isolated, local activity," 20 had limited the
doctrine of "new construction," 21 which exempted from coverage of the
FLSA, employment in the construction of new facilities, which, after completion, would be engaged in commerce. As the Court stated, the activity
there affected was "the redesigning of an existing facility," which was itself
an instrument of interstate commerce.22 The instant court called indistinguishable on principle a circuit court case that attempted to apply the
Vollmer test. In that case, Archer v. Brown & Root, Inc.,'2 workers
constructing a cement fabricating plant, the products of which were to be
used in construction of an interstate highway, were held within the coverage
of FLSA. The Archer court took great pains to show that the plant was
an integral part of the highway construction project,2 not merely a manufacturing plant that might later ship goods in interstate commerce. Both
the lock in the Vollner case and the highway in Archer were themselves
to be instruments of interstate transportation and the workers were found
to be actively engaged in constructing those instruments. In the instant
case, however, the purported effect on commerce is one step further removed, for the plant under construction was not itself to be an instrument
of commerce. Not only must the plant be completed, but its goods must
be produced and subsequently marketed in other states before any commerce is reached. It would seem that in seeking analogies to determine
whether or not commerce has been "affected" under the Hobbs Act, the
17. 52 Stat. 1060 (1938), 29 U.S.C. §201 (1952).
18. 63 Stat. 912 (1949), 29 U.S.C. §206 (1952); 54 Stat. 616 (1940), 29
U.S.C. § 207 (1952).
19. Mitchell v. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955).
20. Id. at 429.
21. The "new construction" doctrine had been strongly stated in Kelly v. Ford,
Bacon & Davis, Inc., 162 F.2d 555 (3d Cir. 1947). However, prior to Volmer,
inroads had been made on a strict application of this doctrine. See Overstreet v.
North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943) ; Mitchell v. Brown, 224 F.2d 359 (8th Cir.
1955); Bennett v. V. P. Loftis Co., 167 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1948).
22. Mitchell v. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 430 (1955).
23. 241 F.2d 663 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 825 (1957).
24. In Archer, the contractor was constructing a long causeway across Lake
Ponchartrain, and the only practicable means of obtaining the huge slabs of prestressed concrete necessary was to fabricate the slabs on the lake shore and put them
immediately on barges. Id. at 669.
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court might well have referred rather to another statute which similarly
seeks to realize the full reaches of the constitutional commerce power. The
National Labor Relations Act,2 5 which empowers the NLRB "to prevent
any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting
commerce," 26 has produced voluminous litigation on the commerce question.
Yet under this statutory language, no assertion of jurisdiction by the NLRB
has ever been held by the Supreme Court to have exceeded the constitutional limit 2 7 Sustaining NLRB jurisdiction, the Court has looked to see
in what relation to commerce the employer stands or has stood in the
past,28 or whether the future movement of goods to be shipped in com29
merce would possibly be constrained by the alleged unfair labor practice.
Several cases decided on the basis of a prospective effect on commerce appear to reach as far as the instant holding: the NLRB has been held to have
jurisdiction over a subcontractor hired to install machinery in a plant under
construction which would manufacture goods for commerce.3 0
However, analogies from the area of social legislation to the area of
criminal law may not be entirely proper. The entry of the federal government into the field of criminal law enforcement was brought about largely
as a result of the inability or unwillingness of the states to enforce their
own criminal laws. As motor, rail and air transport expanded with
industrialization, these instrumentalities were often the victims of racketeering as well as efficient means for the commission of crimes and subsequent
escape from arrest and prosecution. 8 ' This type of criminal activity not
only hampered state enforcement agencies, restrained by state boundaries in
their investigative and apprehending functions, 32 but sometimes created
difficult venue problems as regards the locus of the offense,- resulting in
25. 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1952).
26. 61 Stat 146 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1952).
27. Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 4 (1957).
28. E.g., NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Ass'n, 310 U.S. 318 (1940) (cloth dyer
got goods from and shipped goods in interstate commerce) ; Santa Cruz Fruit Packing
Co. v. NLRB, 303 U.S. 453 (1938) (packer sent goods in interstate commerce);
Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (employer gathered and distributed
news to United States newspapers); NLRB v. E. F. Shuck Constr. Co., 243 F.2d
519 (9th Cir. 1957) (contractor had engaged in other construction jobs affecting
interstate commerce) ; NLRB v. Local 11, United Bhd. of Carpenters, 242 F.2d 932
(6th Cir. 1957); NLRB v. May Dep't Stores Co., 146 F.2d 66 (8th Cir.), 1nodified
and aff'd, 326 U.S. 376 (1945) (department store purchased and sold merchandise
outside the state).
29. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937); NLRB v.
Howell Chevrolet Co., 204 F.2d 79 (9th Cir.), aff'd, 346 U.S. 482 (1953); NLRB v.
Van De Kamp's Holland-Dutch Bakeries, 152 F.2d 818 (9th Cir.), m7odified, 154
F.2d 828 (1946); NLRB v. Richters Bakery, 140 F.2d 870 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 754 (1944).
30. NLRB v. Thomas Rigging Co., 211 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1954). See also
Wayside Press Inc. v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 862 (9th Cir. 1953); Salt River Valley
Water Users' Ass'n v. NLRB, 206 F.2d 325 (9th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Mid-Co
Gasoline Co., 183 F.2d 451 (5th Cir. 1950); NLRB v. Edinburg Citrus Ass'n,
147 F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1945).
31. See Hall, Federal Anti-Theft Legislation, 1 LAW & CONTFmP. PRoa. 424,
425-29 (1934) ; A Note on the Racketeering, Bank Robbery, and "Kick-Back" Laws,
1 LAW & CorzTEP. PRoa. 445 (1934) ; 1 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 399 (1934).
32. Ibid.
33. See, e.g., Boudin, The Place of the Anti-Racketeering Act in Our Constitutional-Legal System, 28 CORNELL L.Q. 261, 266 (1943).
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delay and difficulty in prosecution. To assist the states in the prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of those crimes, Congress has
enacted legislation generally limited in coverage to those cases in which
interstate commerce is used as a means of either accomplishing the crime
or disposing of its proceeds. 3 4 In the Hobbs Act, however, federal jurisdiction is broadly extended to all conduct "affecting commerce." While
it is clear that assertion of federal jurisdiction may be necessary in cases
where interstate relationships give rise to ineffective state criminal law
enforcement, 35 it would seem that these problems of state enforcement arise
principally with respect to crimes committed against commercial instrumentalities or directly affecting the shipment of goods in interstate commerce, and that only in those cases is there a special federal competence to
supplement or replace state enforcement. In the instant case, for example,
there are no apprehension, investigation or venue problems hampering the
ability of the state authorities efficiently to enforce state law. Moreover,
if the broad scope given to commerce in the instant case be coupled with the
inclusive definitions of the crimes in the statute, 36 virtually no extortion or
robbery will be beyond the federal prosecutor's power. It is submitted,
therefore, that the commerce clause when used as the constitutional justification for federal criminal legislation should not be extended to the limits to
which the courts have applied that power in economic and social legislation.
The hard-fought expansion of the commerce power in the last generation 37
was largely accomplished through the enactment of statutes based on the
interrelationships of a unified economy, encompassing policies whose success
depended upon the broadest possible scope being given the commerce clause.
But while it is clear that business expansion and increased economic
activity have to a large extent brought about an increase in criminal
activity which may be said in a sense to affect commerce, 38 federal criminal
legislation was designed neither to effectuate those comprehensive, nationwide policies underlying economic and social legislation, nor to initiate a
national policy with regard to criminal law enforcement which would
necessitate such broad interpretation of the federal commerce power. 39 It
is plausible, then, that the term "affecting commerce" as used in the Hobbs
Act should be constitutionally restricted to cases in which the crimes of
robbery and extortion directly affect the actual movement of goods in
interstate commerce or the instruments by which such goods are transported.
In fact, the bulk of the cases reaching the appellate courts under the Hobbs
34. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 659-60, 1201, 1992, 2312-14 (1952).

Three of these sec-

tions bar federal prosecutions of defendants previously convicted or acquitted on the
merits by a state. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660, 1992 (1952).

35. See Boudin, supra note 33; Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and
Prosecutors"Discretion, 13 LAWv & CONTEmP. PROB. 64 (1948).
36. The statutory definitions were based on those effective in New York. Extortion, see N.Y. PEN. LAw §§ 850, 51. Robbery, see N.Y. PEN. LAw § 2120.
37. See Myers, Interstate Comerce-The Constitutional Interpretation of a

Non-Constitutional Term, 17 U. PiTr. L. Ray. 329 (1956).
38. See note 31 supra.
39. See notes 31, 32 supra and accompanying text.
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Act appear to fall within this limitation.0 Such a limitation would best
accord with the traditional balance of federal and state functions. 41 The
criminal law has been traditionally regarded as the special province of the
states; 42 statutes interdicting the type of activity involved in the instant
case are in force in every state.4 The federal government, however, rather
than restricting its prosecutions, has begun to regard the areas covered by
the Hobbs Act as its peculiar preserve." To the extent that state law enforcement may thus be caused to atrophy, a proper accommodation between
the two governmental units would seem to require that the emphasis of national power be focused on aiding state law enforcement and on intergovernmental cooperation in those areas where interstate economic and commercial
relationships make difficult an efficient state criminal administration.

NOTICE-PREsuMPTION oF RECEnT UPoN PROPER MAILING HEIA
CONCLUSIVE; PROoF OF MAILING IS SUFFICIENT To MEET THE
"NOTICE" RIEQUIREMENT OF LIABILITY INSURANCE CONTRACT
Garnishee insurance company claimed that no notice of an automobile
accident had been given it by its insured and refused to defend the negligence
action which arose from the accident. Judgment having been entered
against the insured, plaintiff thereupon instituted the instant action of
garnishment against the insurer. The policy provided that "written notice
shall be given . . . to the company . . . as soon as practicable."'
Insured's only evidence tending to prove notice was that he had seasonably
2
directed a letter to the insurer's address as listed in the telephone directory
and had placed the letter in a box in his office reserved for outgoing mail. 3
Garnishee denied receipt of the letter. The jury was charged that, unless
the "inference and presumption" that a properly posted letter has been
received was "sufficient to convince [it] by a fair preponderance of the
40. See cases cited note 11 supra. Cf. United States v. Gramlich, 19 F. Supp.
422 (S.D. Ill. 1937).
41. See Boudin, mupra note 33.
42. Ibid.
43. See, e.g., CAL. P'E. CODE §§ 518, 519; Mic. STAT. ANN. §28.410 (1938);
Mo. ANN. STAT. §560.130 (1953); N.Y. PEN. LAW §§850, 851; PA STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §§ 4801, 4806 (1945). In each of these states there are large commercial centers
where such activity as that in the instant case may be expected. Nonetheless, only a
handful of cases under these statutes have reached the appellate level, and none of
them resemble the fact situations typical of the many cases under the Hobbs Act.
44. See Brownell, Federal Slippression of Labor Racketeering: A Report, 9 Sw.
L.J. 341 (1955).
1. Meierdierck v. Miller, 394 Pa. 484, 147 A.2d 406, 407 (1959).
2. The insurance company had moved its offices from the address listed in the
telephone book to new offices in the same city. No notification of this change in
address was given to policyholders. The court takes no account of this fact of actual
misaddressing, but treats the case as one of a "properly addressed prepaid letter."
Id. at 487, 147 A2d at 408. See text accompanying notes 15-18 infra.
3. Again, the court takes no notice of this particular fact, but applies to the
instant case without discussion rules of law said to be applicable in the case of "depositing a properly addressed prepaid letter in the post office." Instant case at 487
147 A.2d at 408. See text accompanying notes 15-18 infra.
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evidence that the letter was mailed and received," 4 it should find for
garnishee. After a verdict for garnishee, the trial court granted plaintiff's
motion for new trial predicated upon error in this charge, and garnishee
appealed. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order granting
a new trial, ruling that the presumption of receipt upon proper mailing is
irrebutable and that evidence of non-receipt is admissible only upon the
issue of mailing. As an alternative line of decision, the court invoked the
analogous doctrine that, where an offer of contract impliedly authorizes the
use of the mails as a means of accepting, acceptance is complete upon mailing, and reasoned that the instant contract could be read as requiring the
mailing of notice only, not receipt by the insurer, as a condition precedent.
Upon either theory, a charge requiring proof of receipt of notice was error.
Meierdierck v. Miller, 394 Pa. 484, 147 A.2d 406 (1959).
The instant case represents the culmination of a long development
toward new substantive law through use of an evidentiary presumption.6
The presumption of receipt upon proper mailing was originally used only
in connection with bills, notes and other commercial paper.7 It was then
extended to all legal situations where communication was effected through
the mails.8 Until the instant case, it was clear in Pennsylvania that proof
4. Instant case at 486, 147 A.2d at 407-08.
5. The cours opinion leaves unclear to what extent the two possible grounds of
decision were regarded as interrelated. Indeed, it is not impossible to read the decision as creating an irrebutable presumption only in cases where, as here, a contract
may be read as requiring only mailing, not receipt, as a condition precedent. It should,
of course, be objected to this interpretation that there is no justification for talking
of "presumption' at all where the presumed fact is not in issue. But it must be
recognized that the effect of an irrebutable presumption, or presumption of law, is
precisely to take the presumed fact out of issue. Inasmuch as the same considerations
-near infallibility of the post office and difficulty of sender's proof of receipt-underlie
both the creation of this particular presumption and the complete-upon-mailing rule,
the court may merely be using the presumption argument to point up the underlying
probative force of mailing upon the issue of receipt, thus to lend more force to the
reasonableness of its interpretation of the contract. If the mails almost invariably
go through, and if all that can be expected of a sender is that he post a properly
addressed letter, parties might well contract only for the sender's obligation to post.
It could at least be argued in a subsequent case, where careful drafting had assured
that the contract of insurance provided for "notice received at this office!' that the
instant case is distinguishable.
6. See Levin, Pen ylvania and the Uniform Rules of Evidence: Presumptions
and Dead Man Statutes, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 10 (1954); MORGAN, MAGUInM &
WErNsTMNI, CASES oN EviDFxcE 440-43 (4th ed. 1957).
7. Kenney v. Altvater & Co., 77 Pa. 34 (1874).
8. The leading case is Susquehanna :Mit. Fire Ins. Co. v. Tunkhannock Toy Co.,
97 Pa. 424 (1881). Although "presumption" language is used, the holding is that
mailing is evidence upon which a jury may find receipt. Similarly, a line of following
cases use the term "presumption!' in context of permissive inference. Cameron Estate,
388 Pa. 25, 35, 130 A2d 173, 177-78 (1957) ; Harper v. Quinlan, 159 Pa. Super. 367,
48 A.2d 113 (1946) ; Phoenix Brewing Co. v. Weiss, 23 Pa. Super. 519 (1903). In
other cases, jury verdicts have been sustained where the trial judge charged that
mailing raised a presumption of receipt, but that the presumption so raised was
rebuttable; that the jury must find receipt on the whole of the evidence. Neubert v.
Armstrong Water Co., 211 Pa. 582, 61 AtI. 123 (1905); Whitmore v. Dwelling
House Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 405 (1892). In Jensen v. McCorkell, 154 Pa. 323, 26 Atl.
366 (1893), the trial court charged that there existed a presumption of delivery. It
does not appear that he charged the jury further on the effect of the presumption. A
jury verdict for sender was sustained. Finally, in Thomas v. Employers Liab. Assur.
Co., 284 Pa. 129, 135, 130 AtI. 322, 324 (1925), the court on appeal, finding in the
record no denial of the fact of mailing, argues from the fact of receipt as established.
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of proper mailing was "prima facie evidence" 9 of receipt which could be
rebutted by showing that the letter mailed was not in fact received.' 0 The
cases appeared to leave the burden of persuasion upon the party seeking to
prove receipt; receipt, in all events, remained in issue."' But the consideration that "the overwhelming weight of statistics clearly indicates that letters
properly mailed and deposited in the post office are received by the
addressees," 12 plus the recognition of the difficulty of the sender's proving
receipt, was sufficient to cause the instant court to turn the presumption into
a rule of substantive law. Mailing is held the legal equivalent of receipt
3
and of itself constitutes effective notice; receipt is withdrawn from issue.'
In other cases where procedural presumptions have served as evolutional vehicles for the emergence of new rules of substantive law, policy
factors extrinsic to the immediate problem of proof of the presumed fact
have, at least in part, underlain the creation and transmutation of the
presumption. Thus, it was not the difficulty of proving loss of a deed, nor
the statistical probability that in fact a deed had once existed, that led to
the presumption of a lost grant upon twenty years possession; it was rather
the desire to give security of ownership to the tenant, to inspire his improvement of the land, to reward his useful occupancy at the expense of
the unprofitable absentee owner. Yet, in the instant case, both the creation
of the presumption and the court's conversion of it into a substantive rule
are sought to be justified upon procedural considerations alone: statistical
probability on the one hand, difficulty of proof on the other. It should be
apparent that to transform such a presumption into a rule of law is to
destroy all the value of the presumption and, at the same time, to distort
the substantive law itself. Assume that, substantively, what we really
want proved is receipt. If we create no presumption, sender must prove
receipt in actual fact. This seems unfair, both because, if he can prove
mailing, the very great probability is that the letter was received, and
because, in any event, he can seldom have any information as to what
happened to the letter after he posted it. To obviate such problems, a
presumption is created. But if that presumption is made conclusive, so
that a showing of mailing is sufficient to make sender's case, we return to
our original difficulties. Addressee must now prove non-mailing. Supposing the same infallibility of the postal system, addressee's testimony of non9. The court in the instant case in fact speaks of the presumption in terms of
the prima fade evidence rule. It then goes on to hold that denial of receipt does not
"nullify the presumption and leave the question of the receipt of the notice open to
the jury's determination." Instant case at 147 A.2d 408. "The testimony of the
addressee that he did not receive the letter, while admissible, is admitted only because
of the import of that testimony on the issue of whether the letter was inaled." Ibid.
10. Beeman v. Supreme Lodge, 215 Pa. 627, 64 Atl. 792 (1906) ; Fairfield Packing
Co. v. Southern Mut Fire Ins. Co., 193 Pa. 184, 44 At. 317 (1899) ; Whitmore v.
Dwelling House Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 405, 407, 412 (1892); Teitelbaum v. Board of
Revision, 65 Pa. D. & C. 619 (C.P. 1947) ; cases cited note 8 supra.
11. Fairfield Packing Co. v. Southern Mut. Fire Ins. Co., supra note 10; Whitmore v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., supra note 10, at 407, 412; cases cited notes 8 and
10 supra.
12. Instant case at 487, 147 A2d 408.
13. See note 9 supra.
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receipt, if true, clearly gives rise to the same very strong probability of
non-mailing as sender's testimony of mailing gave of receipt. Moreover,
addressee has no more knowledge of non-mailing than had sender of receipt;
in fact, addressee is in a far worse position: sender, at least, could have
elected to send a registered letter. Is addressee now entitled to a charge
that the law presumes and infers that if he did not receive the letter, sender
did not send it? But not only have we merely put addressee into the same
difficult position from which we had extricated sender; we have also created
an anomaly within our substantive law. What we want ultimately proved
is still that addressee received the letter. Yet, with the presumption made
conclusive, should sender prove the fact of mailing and addressee prove a
great contemporary post office fire in which all mail was destroyed, sender
nevertheless would win his case. Or suppose a case in which the relevant
evidence presented does not consist merely in the respective bald assertions
and denials of sender and addressee. Suppose that, in opposition to sender's
unsupported testimony of mailing, addressee presents the testimony of his
postman that no mail was received at addressee's address during the week in
question. If mailing alone is at issue, the postman's testimony must be
discounted by the probability of loss en route-a probability that inures to
the benefit of sender! On the other hand, should sender prove by the
testimony of a postal clerk that he mailed the letter, and addressee can
counter only with an uncorroborated denial of receipt, would the evidence
support a verdict for addressee? Add to these considerations one final
practical problem. It seems impossible that the mailing-at-issue rule can be
uniformly applied. It was perhaps not too much to expect of a petty jury
that they consider evidence of mailing on the issue of receipt: mailing is,
after all, prerequisite to receipt; and if the jury applies evidence of mailing
to the issue of mailing as well as to the issue of receipt, no harm is done.
The judge can easily make clear that addressee is not to be held unless he
received the letter. But imagine the psychic processes of a jury laboring
under instructions that testimony of non-receipt goes only to the issue of
non-mailing. The chance that the jury will misapply the evidence, find
non-receipt instead of non-mailing, and decide the case upon an issue that
the court believes is not even before it, is very great. Caution by the judge
that the jury is to consider addressee's testimony of non-receipt but that
addressee is to be held if the jury find mailing, is only likely to confuse. In
sum, these considerations appear to dictate that the presumption of receipt
have procedural, evidentiary effect only, and that the question of what precisely is at issue, as between mailing and receipt, be left entirely to the
14
extrinsic substantive law of the case at trial.
We are thus brought to consider the court's second line of reasoning:
interpretation of the contract to require only mailing, not receipt, of notice.
That, in spite of the court's presumption language, such contract construction was the real grounds of the decision, seems indicated by the court's
14. McCoRmicK, EvmicE § 311 (1954); 8 WImoRE, EvDENCE § 2519 (3d ed.
1940).
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failure to consider, first, that the insured's evidence here was not of mailing
but merely of deposit in the office out-box 15 and, second, that the letter was
in fact misaddressed, though through no fault of the insured. 16 The former
fact, under Pennsylvania precedent, would suffice to prevent the raising of
a presumption of receipt, under the no-presumption-upon-a-presumption
rule.17 The latter fact, in turn, would have no small implications upon the
propriety of applying to this case a presumption based in part upon the
statistical probability of delivery of a properly addressed letter; only if
what were really in issue were sender's fulfilment of an obligation to mail
would sender's faultlessness excuse the misaddress.' 8 Further, although
apparently inconsistent with earlier Pennsylvania cases interpreting the
similar notification clauses of liability insurance contracts as requiring
receipt of notice as a condition precedent to insurer liability,' 9 decision of
the instant case upon the contract ground would find support in the cases
of several other jurisdictions which hold mailing alone sufficient.20
In its interpretation of the notice requirement,2 ' the court relies upon
analogy to the rule of acceptance of a contract offer by mail which, by
traditional contract doctrine, is effective upon mailing.2 2 In support of
the application of the analogy, it can be argued that both offeror and in15. See note 3 supra.
16. See note 2 supra.

17. Mankin v. Parry, 70 Pa. Super. 558 (1919). The letter was held not admissible. A fortiori, it could, if admitted, create no presumption of receipt. Edelson
v. American Employers Ins. Co., 92 Pa. Super. 90 (1927). See Harrison v. Welsh,
295 Pa. 501, 509, 145 Ati. 507, 510 (1929).
18. Wigmore specifically cautions against confusion of cases apparently involving
the presumption of receipt where mailing is in issue, with those where receipt is in
issue. 8 WiGMopx, EVIDENCE §2519 (3d ed. 1940). The commingled alternative
reasoning of the court in the instant case, see note 5 supra, leaves the issues thoroughly
tangled.
19. Whitmore v. Dwelling House Ins. Co., 148 Pa. 405, 407, 412 (1892). The
assumption that receipt is ultimately in issue underlies the presumption-of-receipt
cases when that doctrine is applied to insurance notification. See Susquehanna Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Tunkhannock Toy Co., 97 Pa. 424 (1881). This position was in
accord with that of other jurisdictions who also found a custom that notice might
be mailed, Yanago v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 164 Va. 258, 178 S. ER 904 (1935), and
utilized a similar presumption of receipt upon mailing. Schneider v. Boston Elevated
Ry., 259 Mass. 654, 156 N.E. 734 (1927). Massachusetts law had developed from
early doctrine that the mails are to be deemed the agent of one who contemplates
receipt of notice by that means, Munn v. Baldwin, 6 Mass. 316, 317 (1810), to its
present rule that notice must be received as well as sent. Sheldon v. Bennett, 282
Miass. 240, 184 N.E. 722 (1933), appears to have clarified dicta in Schneider v. Boston
Elevated Ry., 259 Mass. 654, 156 N.E. 734 (1927), which seemed to indicate that
proof of proper mailing by insured might be sufficient to prove "notice."

20. E.g., Club Aluminum Co. v. American Indem. Co., 290 Ill. App. 487, 8
N.E.2d 526 (1937) ; Schott v. Continental Auto Ins. Underwriters, 326 Mo. 92, 31
S.W2d 7 (1930).
21. Nearly all liability insurance contracts contain similar notification clauses.

See Matthews, Obligations of Insured and Inmirer Under Automobile Liability Policies, 11 ARK. L. REV. 26, 27 (1956). They are intended to allow the insurer adequate
time to investigate and prepare defense of the insured, and to reduce opportunity for

fraudulent and inflated claims and collusive suits. 1957 Wisc. L. REv. 669. Compliance is generally held to be a condition precedent to recovery upon the insurance
contract. E.g., Edelson v. American Employers Ins. Co., 92 Pa. Super. 90 (1927);

Titus v. Travellers Ins. Co., 268 App. Div. 802, 49 N.Y.S2d 203 (1944) ; Buckley v.
Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 113 Wash. 13, 192 Pac. 924 (1920).
22. See Munhall v. Travellers Ins. Co., 300 Pa. 327, 150 Atl. 645 (1930); 1
CORBIN, CoNnTAcrs § 78 (1950); 1 WILLIsToN, CoNTRAcrS § 81 (rev. ed. 1936).
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surance company contemplate communication by mail, that both have equal
expectancy of actual receipt, that both engage in transactions under the
same conditions of known, and actual, reliability of the postal service. In
both cases, senders would experience the same difficulty of proof of receipt;
in both, the addressee's demand may be reasonably interpreted to extend
only to such performance as it is within the power of the sender, in the
exercise of normal prudence, to deliver. And in insurance cases, moreover,
it could be contended that the insured is in a far less capable position
economically to bear the risk of loss in those rare cases in which a letter is
in fact lost in transit. But, on the other hand, a number of distinctions
may be noted between the contract-offer and the insurance-notice situations
which militate against the interpretation of insurance contracts by analogy
to the complete-on-mailing rule.2 While the contract offeror, who has
recently made the offer and is in a position to know that an acceptance
may be forthcoming within the neighborhood of a fixed date, may reasonably
be expected to reinquire of an apparently unresponding offeree, the insurance company has no reason to be aware of that fortuitous, distant event
which should give one of its policyholders occasion to notify it; it cannot
inquire of the insured when no letter is received. Again, the offeree often
expects no immediate return communication from the offeror. But the
insured, who finds himself party defendant in a negligence suit, has reason
to renotify if he gets no quick response from the insurance company which
should be taking over preparation for his defense. And finally, while it is
seldom more profitable to an offeree to claim that he accepted a contract
offer and to seek judicial relief for breach than actually to consummate and
perform the contract, insureds may have very real reasons for wanting to
appear to notify their insurers without actually notifying them. Where
passengers in their automobiles or visitors in their homes are injured, they
often sympathize more closely with party plaintiff than with their own
insurance companies. Where the injured plaintiff's claim on the facts is
not strong, the notice-effective-on-mailing rule encourages collusive action
wherein the insured presents a colorable but inadequate defense, then
alleges mailing of notice, leaving the insurer with the equally difficult alternative burdens of demonstrating collusion or non-mailing. It is believed that
these significantly different factors in the position of the insurer make the
court's application of the contract-acceptance analogy here unsound. But,
at any rate, the instant case puts Pennsylvania insurers on notice to write
into the notification clauses of insurance contracts an express condition
precedent of actual receipt. In possible future litigation under a contract
so drafted, it is not unlikely that the court could be persuaded to explain
the instant holding as limited to its contract construction grounds, and so
leave upon the offeree the burden of persuasion upon the issue of receipt of
notice.
23. For purposes of this discussion, we assume that the acceptance-effective-onmailing rule is a reasonable one within its own domain. COaBIN, op. cit. supra note
22, at 246-50, makes an extended analysis of the various suggested rationalizations
of, and justifications for the rule.

